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Carlson v. Green 
5. To satisfy this test, petitioners need not show that 
Congress recited any specific "magic words". See the 
dissenting opinion of the CHIEF JUSTICE, post, at 2 and 
note 2. Instead, our inquiry at this step in the analysis 
is whether Congress has indicated that it intends the 
statutory remedy to replace, rather than to complement, the 
Bivens remedy. Where Congress decides to enact a statutory 
remedy which it views as fully adequate only in combination 
with the Bivens remedy, e.g. 28 u.s.c. § 2680(h), that 
congressional decision should be given effect by the 
courts. 
Subsequent footnotes will be renumbered accordingly. 
Sincerely, 
\
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JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
~ltpftntt <!JMtrl cf tlrt Jtti:ltb ,jhtftg 
Jl'MJri:ttgictt. ~. <!f. 2ll.;i'!-~ 
April 18, 1980 
Re: No. 78-1261, Carlson v. Green 
Dear Lewis, 
Please add my name to your opinion con-
curring in the judgment in this case. 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
~·' 
4-18-80 
To: The Chief Justice 
Mr. Justice Brannan 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
M.r. J\Uit1 Ot.l ~ia1 te 
Mr. Justice ~.a.reha.ll 
Mr . Juat1o~ Blaokmun 
tl:r. Just1 1Jf> Huh:oquist 
Mr . .Tnatir·e Stevena 
From: Mr. Ju~tico Powell 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES APR 1 e 1980 
Recirculated: __________ _ 
No. 78-1261 
Norman A, Carlson, Director, 
Federal Bureau of Prisons, 
et al., Petitioners, 
v. 
~arie Green, Administratrix 
of the Estate of Joseph 
Jones, Jr. 
On Writ of Certiorari to the 
United States Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit. 
[March -, 1980] 
MR. JusTICE PowELL, with whom MR. JusTICE STEWART ' 
joins, collcurring in the judgment. 
Although I join the judgment, I do not agree with much 
of the language in the Court's opinion. The Court states the 
principles governing Bivens actions as follows: 
"Bivens established that the victims of a constitutionai 
violation . . . have a right to recover damages. . . . Such 
a cause of action may be defeated ... in two situations. 
The first is when defendants demonstrate 'special factors 
counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action 
by Congress.' . . • The second is when defendants 
show that Congress has provided an alternative remedy 
which it explicitly declared to be a substitute for recovery 
directly under the Constitution and viewed as equally 
effective .... " Ante, at S:-4 (emphasis in original). 
The foregoing statement contains dicta that go well beyond 
the prior holdings of this Court. 
I 
We are concerned here with inferring a right of action for 
damages directly from the Constitution. In Davis v. Pass-
man, 442 U. S. 228, 242 (1979), the Court said that persons 
who have "no l other] effective means of redress" "must be 
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able to invoke the existing jurisdiction of the courts for the 
protection of their justiciable constitutional rights." The 
Davis rule now sets the boundaries of the "principled discre-
tion" that must be brought to bear when a court is asked to 
infer a private cause of action not specified by the enacting 
authority. Jd., at 252 (PowELL, J., dissenting). But the 
Court's opinion, read literally, would restrict that discretion 
dramatically. Today we are told that a ~<?urt must entertain 
a Bivens suit unless the action is "defeated" in one of ~wo 
specified ways. 
Bivens recognized that implied remedies may be unneces-
sary when Congress has provided "equally effective" alterna-
tive remedies. Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 
403 U. S. 388, 397 (1971); see Davis v. Passman, supra, 442 
U. S., at 248. The Court now volunteers the view that a de-
fendant cannot defeat a Bivens action simply by showing that 
there are adequate alternative avenues of relief. The de-
fendant also must show that Congress "explicitly declared 
[its remedy] to be a substitute for recovery directly under the 
Constitution and viewed [it] as equally effective." Ante, at 
4 (emphasis in original). These are unnecessarily rigid con-
ditions. The Court cites no authority and advances no policy 
reason-indeed no reason at all-for imposing this threshold 
burden upon the defendant in an implied remedy case. 
The Court does implicitly acknowledge that Congress 
possesses the power to enact adequate alternative remedies 
that would be exclusive. Yet, today's opinion apparently will 
permit Bivens plaintiffs to ignore entirely adequate remedies 
if Congress has not clothed them in the prescribed linguistic 
garb. No purpose is served by affording plaintiffs a choice of 
remedies in these circumstances. Nor is there any precedent 
for requiring federal courts to blind themselves to congres-
sional intent expressed in language other than that whid1 we 
prescribe. 
A defendant also may defeat the Bivens remedy under 
today's decision if "special factors" counsel "hesitation." But 
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the Court provides no further guidance on this point. The 
opinion states simply that no such factors are present in this 
case. The Court sa.ys that petitioners enjoy no "independent 
status in our constitutional scheme" that would make judi-
cially created remedies inappropriate. Ante, at 4. But the 
implication that official status may be a "special factor" is with-
drawn in the sentence that foilows, which conciudes that 
qualified immunity affords all the protection necessary to 
ensure the effective performance of official duties. No other 
factors relevant to the purported exception are mentioned. 
One is left to wonder whether judicial discretion in this area 
will hereafter be confined to the question of alternative reme-
dies, which is in turn reduced to the single determination that 
congressional action does or does not comport with the specifi-
cations prescribed by this Court. Such a drastic curtailment 
of discretion would be inconsistent with the Court's long-
standing recognition that Congress is ultimately the appro-
priate body to create federal remedies. See ante, at 4-5; 
Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, supra, 403 
U. S., at 397. A plaintiff who seeks his remedy directly under 
the Constitution asks the federal courts to perform an essen-
tially legislative task. In this situation, as Mr. Justice Harlan 
once said, a court should "take into account [a range of policy 
considerations] at least as broad as the range of those a legis-
lature would consider with respect to an express statutory 
authorization of a traditional remedy." Bivens, supra, at 
407. The Court does not explain why this discretion should 
be limited in the manner announced today. 
The Court's absolute language is all the more puzzling 
because it comes in a case where the implied remedy is plainly 
appropriate under any measure of discretion. The Federal 
Tort Claims Act, on which petitioners relv, simply is not an 
adequate remedy.1 And there a.re reasonably clear indications 
1 The Federal Tort Claims Act is not a federal remedial scheme at all, 
l)qt {t wnivrr of sovereign immunity that permits an injured claimant to. 
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that Congress did not intend that statute to displace Biven8 
claims. See ante, at 4-5. No substantial contrary policy has 
been identified, and I am aware of none. I therefore agree 
that a private damages remedy properly is inferred from the 
Constitution in this case. But I do not agree that Bivens 
plaintiffs have a "right" to such a remedy whenever the 
defendant fails to show that Congress has "provided an 
[equally effective] alternative remedy which it explicitly 
declared to be a substitute . ... " In my view, the Court's 
willingness to infer federal causes of action that cannot be 
found in the Constitution or in a statute denigrates the doc-
trine of separation of powers and hardly comports with a 
rational system of justice. Cf. Cannon v. University of Chi-
cago, 441 U.S. 677, 730-749 (1979) (PowELL, J., dissenting).2 
II 
In Part HI of its opinion, the Court holds that 11 'whenever 
the relevant state survival statute would abate a Bivens-type 
action brought against defendants whose conduct results in 
death, the federal common law a1lows survival of the action. '" 
Ante, at 9, quoting 581 F. 2d 699, 674-675 (CA7 1978). I 
recover damages against the United States where a private person "would 
be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where 
the act or omission occurred." 28 U.S. C. § 1346 (b); see also 28 U.S. C. 
§ 2674. Here, as in Bivens itself, a plaintiff denied l1is constitutional 
remedy wuuld be remitted to the vagaries of state law. See 403 U. S., at 
394-395. Thr FTCA gives the plaintiff even less t11an l1e would receive 
under state law in many rase. , because the :statute is hedged with protec-
tions for the United State>J. A~ the Court points out, the FTCA allows 
neither jury trial nor punitive damages. Ante, at 7. And recovery may 
be barrPd altogether if the claim arises from a "discretionary function" or 
"the execution of a statute or regulat.ion, whether or not such statute or 
regulation is valid." 28 U.S. C.§ 2680 (a) . 
2 I do not suggest that courts enjoy the same degree of freedom to infer 
causes of action from statutrs as from t.he Con~titution. See Davis v. 
Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 241-242 (1979). I do believe, however, that tl1e 
Court today has over~tepped the bounds of rational judicial decision-
making in both contexts. 
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agree that the relevant policies require the application of 
federal common law to allow survival in this case. 
It is not "obvious" to me, however, that "the liability of 
federal officials for violations of citizens' constitutional rights 
should be governed by uniform rules" in every case. Ante, at 
8; see id., at 9. On the contrary, federal courts routinely 
refer to state law to fill the procedural gaps in national reme-
dial schemes. The policy against invoking the federal com-
mon law except where necessary to the vitality of a federal 
claim is codified in 42 U. S. C. § 1988, which directs that state 
law ordinarily will govern those aspects of § 1983 actions not 
covered by the "laws of the United States." 
The Court's opinion in this case does stop short of mandat-
ing uniform rules to govern aU aspects of Bivens actions. 
Ante, at 9-10, n. 10. But the Court also says that the prefer-
ence for state law embodied in § 1988 is irrelevant to the 
selection of rules that will govern actions against federal offi-
cers under Bivens. Ibid. I see no basis for this view. In 
Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 498-504, and n. 25 (1978), 
the Court thought it unseemly that different rules should 
govern the liability of federal and state officers for similar 
constitutional wrongs. I would not disturb that under-
standing today. 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STA'rm 
No. 78-1261 
Norman A. Carlson, Director, 
FPderal Bureau of Prisons, 
et al., Petitioners, 
v. 
Marie Gre("ll, Administratrix 
of the Estate of Joseph 
Jones, Jr. 
On Writ of Certiorari to the 
United States Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit. 
[March -, 1980] 
MR. Jus'rlCI•; BHENNAN delivered the opiuion of the Court. 
Respondent brought this suit in the District Court for the 
Southern District of 'Indiana on behalf of the estate of her 
deceased SOil , Joseph Jones, Jr. , alleging that he suffered 
personal iuj uries from which he died because the petitioners, 
federal prison officials, violated his due process, equal pr~ 
tection , and Eighth Amendment rights.1 Asserting jurisdic-
tion under 28 U. S. C. § 1331 (a) , she claimed compensatory 
and punitive damages for the constitutional violations. Two 
1 More ;;pecifieally, re.,].xmdent allrgru that petitioners, being fully ap~ 
pri;;ed of t hr gro~,; inadequacy of medical fa.cilitie:s and staff at 1 he Federal 
Correc1ion Center in Terre Haute, Indiana, and of the ::.eriousne:os of 
Jones' chronie a~thmatie condition, nonethele:<:; kept him in that facility 
agninst the advire of doctor,;, failed to give him competent medical •tt-
tention for :;ome eight hour,; after he had tUl a.,;thmatie attack, adminis-
tered eoutm-iuiliea,ted drug:> which ma,dc hi;; at.tnck more ~evcrc, attempted 
to use a respirator known to be inoperative which further imprdecl his 
breathing. and dPla.,·ecl for too long a time his tmusfer to an outside 
ho:spital. The complaint further allege:; tlmt June,;' death resulted from 
these acts and omi~sions, that petitioner;; were dclibrra.tcly indifferent to 
Jane,;' seriou10 medical need:;, and tha.t their indifference was in part 
attributable to racial prejudice. 
Stt.war t 
W' ~ tA 
l<i..J..,.. ) ~ ' , 1 
r 
• E>n.,., .r 
.. 
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questions are presented for decision: ( 1) Is a remedy avail-
able directly under the Constitution given that respondent's 
allegations could also support ~ suit against the United States 
under the Federal Tort Claims Act? 2 and (2) If so, is survival 
of the cause of action governed by federal conunon law or by 
state statutes? 
I 
The District Court held that under Estelle v. Gamble, 429 
U. S. 97 (1976). the allegations set out in note 1, supra, 
pleaded a violatio11 of the Eighth Amendment's proscription 
againsL i11f1iction of cruel and unusual punishment a giving 
rise to a cause of action for damages under Bivens v. Six 
Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 
U. S. 388 (1971). The court recognized that the decedent 
could have maintained this action if he had survived, but dis-
missed the complaint because in its view the damages remedy 
as a matter of federal law was limited to that provided by 
Indiana's survivorship and wro11gful death laws and. as the 
court construed those laws, the damages available to Jones' 
estate failed to meet § 1331 (a)'s $10,000 jurisdictional 
amount requirement. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit agrcPCl that an Eighth Amendment violation was 
pleaded umler Estelle and that a cause of action was stated 
2 This qur~f ion was pre:<t>ntecl in the petition for crrtiomri, but not in 
<'iilwr the: Di~trir1 . Court. or thr Comt of Appeals. However, rrspondent 
doe>; nof; ohj<'('f , fo it~ drei~ion b~· this Court. Though Wf' do not normally 
clPc·ide i~:suc>s nof ]H'P:SPnted below, we arr not }Jrecluded from doiug :,:o. E. g., 
Youakim v. Miller. 425 U.S. 231, 234 (1976). Here, the i~;;ue i:s squarely 
presentt'd :wd fully briefed. It i;; an important, recurring is:sn(' and is 
propPrly rai~Pd in :UJothrr pc>tition for certiorari being held pending dispo-
sition of thi~ ca~r. See Loe v. Armistead, 582 F. 2d 1291 (CA4 Hl78), 
cert. pending sub nom. Moffit v. Loe, No. 78-1260. We conclude that 
the intrrP:;t.~ or j11flirial administration will be ~ervcd Ly addre;;:;ing the 
issnc on its merit~. 
3 Petitioners do no(, contest 1he determination that the allegations ~;atisfy 
the standard::> ~et out in E~telte. 
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under Bivens, but reversed the holding that § 1331 (a)'s juris-
dictional amount requirement was not met.'1 Rather, the 
Court of Appeals held that ~ 1331 (a) was satisfied because 
"whenever the relevant State survival statute would abate a 
Bive11s-type action brought against defendants whose con-
duct results in death, the federal common law allows survival 
of thr action." 581 F. 2d 669, 675 (1978). The court rea-
soned that the Indiana law, if applied, would "subvert" "the 
policy of allowing complete vindication of constitutional 
rights'' by making it "more advantageous for a tortfeasor to 
kill rather than to injure." !d., at 674. We granted cer. 
tior·ari. 442 U.S.- (1979). We affirm. 
II 
Bivens established that the victims of a constitutional vio-
lation by a fedt>ral ageut ~av~ a right to recover damages 
against the official in federal court despite the absence of 
any statute co11ferring such a right. Such a cause of action 
may be drf<'atcd in a particular ease, however, in ~ situa-
tions. The first is when defendants demonstrate "special fac-
4 The rt>lPvaut Jndi:uw Iii\\' prm·ide;; thaL a per~onal injury claim does 
not ~\uTi\'(• whprc• th<· act>< t·omplain('([ of muse<l thr victim';; death. Incl. 
Code § :~-t-1-1- 1. lndi:mt <loc:; provide a wrongful drath rau,;e of action 
for tiH• prr~onal rrprp~rntati\·e of onr who;;p death i:; cau,;ed by an alleged 
wrongful art. or omi~<"'ion. Damage~ may "inrlud!P], but· Lare] not 
limited to, n•n,:omihlc mrdi<'al, hoKpit a.!, func•ral nnd hurial expensrs, and 
lo:<t earning~<." But. if fhe c!P.cC'clent, is not ~urvivcd by a ~pOUR{', dept•ndent 
child, or dl'pendent next of kin. then t.hr recon>ry i~ limited to expenses 
incurrpd iu eounPC'tion with the death. Ind . Code § :34-1-1-2. 
Th!1 Di;;trict Conr1 read the complaint in thi~ ral'r a.-: ~tMing rlaim:; 
undrr both §§ !34-1-1-1 and :~4-1-1-2. Acrordingl~r. thr conrt a&>umed 
that. reC'on•ry 011 tho cl:1im \\':1>< limited t.o expen~r~ (all of whieh would be 
pa.id by tho Fedrral Gon•r1m1ent) onl~' becaw;e .lone,; died without a spon~c 
or :my dqwncl<·nt:-: . Thr Court of App!1a1~< n•nd the complaint a;; "tnting 
onlr a ,-urvi\'Or,<hip rlaim on behnlf of Jon<'" tmclrr § 34--1-1-1. Thus it. 
ai:>SurnPfl that the clnim would ha.ve abatrd C'vcn if Jone:s had ]pft, de-
pend\•nt,; or :\ ,.:pou~e. 581 F . 2<1 (i()9, l\72, n. 4. H.e:'olution of t.Ius cona 
:(lict ifi irrelrvnn1 in ligh1 of our holding to<hy. 
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tors counselling hesitati011 in the absence of affirmative action 
by Congress." !d., 403 U. S., at 396; Davis v. Passman, 
442 U. S. 228, 245 (1979). The second is when defendants 
show that Congress has provided an alternative remedy which 
it explicitly declared to be a substitute for recovery directly 
under tho Constitution and viewed as equally effective. 
Bivens, 403 U. S., at 397; Davis v. Passma:n, 442 U. S., at 
245-247. 
Neither situation obtaius in this case. First, the case. in-
volves no special factors counselling hesitation in the absence 
of affirmative actio11 by Cougress. PetiLioners do llOt enjoy 
such independent status iu our constitutional scheme as to 
suggest that judicially created remedies against them might 
be inappropriate. Davis v. Passman. 442 U. S., at 246. 
Moreover, ewn if requiring them to defend respondent's suit 
might inhibit their efforts to perform their official duties, 
the qualified immunity accorded them under Butz v. Eco-
nomou, 438 U. H. 478 (1978), provides adequate protection. 
See Davis v. Passma:n, 442 U. S., at 246. 
Second, we have here no explicit congressional declaration 
that perso11S injured by - federal oiti"cers' violations of the 
Eighth Amendnwnt may not recover money damages from 
the agents but must be remitted to another remedy, equally 
effE>cti vc in the view of Congress. Petitioners point to nothing 
in the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) or its legislative his-
tory to show that Congress meant to pre-empt a Bivens 
remedy or to create an equally efi'ecti ve remedy for con-
stitutional violations. FTCA was enacted long before Bivens 
was decided, but whe11 Congress amended FTCA in 1974 to 
create a cause of action against the United States for inten-
tional torts committed by federal law enforcement officers, 28 
U. S. C. ~ 2680 (h), the congressional comments accompanying 
that amendment made it crystal clear that Congress views 
FTCA and Bivens as parallel, complementary causes of action: 
(' [AJ fter the date of euactmettt of this measure, innocent 
l?w 
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individuals who are subjected to raids [like that in 
Bivens] will have a cause of action agaiust the individual 
Federal agents and the Federal Government. Further-
more, this provision should be viewed as a counterpart 
to the Bivens case and its progenty [sic], in that it waives 
the defense of sovereign immu11ity so as to make the 
Govermuent independently liable in damages for the same 
type of conduct that is alleged to have occurred in Bivens 
(and for which that case imposes liability upon the in-
dividual Government officials involved." S. Rep. No. 
93-588, ~l3d Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1973) (emphasis 
supplied). 
In the absener of a contrary expression from Congress, ~ 2680 
(h) thus contemplates that victims of the kind of intentional 
wrongdoing alleged in this complaint shall have an action 
under }i'TCA agaiust the United Btates as well as a Bivens 
action against the individual officials alleged to have infringed 
their co 11 stit u tiona] rights. 
This COIJclusion is buttressed by the significant fact that 
Cougress follows the practice of explicitly stating when it 
means to make FTCA an exclusive remedy. See 38 U. S. C. 
§ 4116 (a). 42 r. S. C. ~ 233 (a). 42 U. S. C. ~ 2458a, 10 
U. S. C. ~ 1089 (a). and 22 U. S. C. § 817 (a) (malpractice 
by certain Government health personnel); 28 U. S. C. ~ 2679 
(b) (operation of motor vehicles by federal employees); and 
42 U. S. C. ~ 247b (k) (manufacturers of swine flu vaccine). 
Furthermore, Congress has not taken action on other bills that 
would expand the exclusivity of FTCA. See, e. g., S. 695, 
96th Cong .. 1st Sess. (1979); H. R. 2659, 96th Cong., 1st 
Sess. (HJ79); S. 3314, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978). 
Four additional factors, each suggesting that the Bivens 
remedy is more effective than the FTCA remedy, also support 
our conclusiou that Congress did not intend to limit respond-
ent to an FTC A action. First. the Bivens remedy, in addition 
to compeusating victims, serves a deterrent purpose. See: 
78-1261-0PINION 
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Butz v. Bconomou, 438 U. S. 478, 505 (1978). 5 Because the 
Bivens remedy is recoverable against individuals, it is a more 
effective deterrent than the FTCA remedy against the United 
States. 1 t is almost axiomatic that the threat of damages 
has a deterrent effect,6 Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U. S. 409, 
442 (1976) (WHITE, J., concurrillg in the judgment), surely 
particularly so when the individual official faces personal 
financial liability. 
Petitioners argue that FTCA liability is a more effective 
deterrent because the individual employees responsible for the 
Govermnen t's liability would risk loss of employment 7 and 
becaus<'S the Government would be forced to promulgate 
corrective policies. That argument suggests, however, that 
the supPriors would not take thC' same actions when an em-
ployee is found persoually liable for violation of a citizen's 
constitutional rights. The more reasonable assumption is that 
responsible superiors are motivated not only by concern for 
the public fisc but also by concern for the Government's 
integrity. 
Second, our decisions, although not expressly addressing ? 
and deciding tlw qtH'stion, indicate that p~nay 
be awarded iu a Bivens suit. Punitive damages are "a partie-
r. ..J-2 11 . S. C. § ](.),'{:{ ~<'rve,; ~imilar purpose:>. Ser, e. g., Robertson v. 
Wegma1111 . ..J.:~H 1'. ::l . . 5~4, 590-591 (1978) ; Carey v. Piphus. 485 U.S. 247, 
256 (Hl7~) ; J!itl'hum " · Foster, 407 U. S. 225, 242 (1972) ; Monroe v. 
Pape, :lG5 U.S. lo7, li:Z-187 (1961). 
t~ Indrrd, nnd<'rlying the qualifird immunity which public officials enjoy 
for action~ taken in good faith i~:> thr fear that expo::;ure to pcr::;onalliability 
would otherwiRr d<·ter them from acting at all. See Butz v. Economou, 
438 U. 8. 47~, 497 (1978) ; Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 240 (1974). 
7 Some doubt. ha~ been east on the validity of the as~umption that there 
exi"t. adt?quate mrl'hani~ms for rli"riplining federal Pmployt?es in such cases. 
See T<•,;timOH) of Griitin B. BPI!, Attornt?y General of the United St<ttes, 
.Joint. HPariup; bcfon· thl' SubeommittPe 011 Citiz~·n~ and Shareholders 
Right;; and Benwdie,.. and tlw Subcommittee on Admini~:>trative Practice 
aml Procedure of the Sl'nate Committee on the Judiciary, Part 1, 95th 
Cong., 2d Se.~~ . , at 6 (1978). 
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ular remedial mechanism normally available in the federal 
courts," Bivens, 403 U. S., at 397, and are especially appro-
priate to redress the violation by a government official of a 
citizen's constitutional rights. Moreover, punitive damages 
are available in "a proper" § 1983 action, Carey v. Piphus, 
435 U. S. 247. 257, n. 11 (1978) (punitive damages not 
awarded beca,use District Court found defendants "did not act 
with a malicious intenti011 to deprive respondents of their 
rights or to do them some other injury"),8 and Butz v. Eco-
nornu, supra, suggests that the "constitutional design" would 
be stood on its head if federal officials did not face at least the 
same liability as state officials guilty of the same constitutional 
transgression. 438 TT. R .. at 504. But punitive damages in an 
FTCA suit are sta,tutorily prohibited. 28 U. S. C. § 2674. 
Thus FTCA is that much less effective than a Bivens action 
as a deterrent to unconstitutional acts. 
Third, a plaiutiff cannot opt for a jury in an FTCA action, 
28 U. S. C. § 2402, as he may in a Bivens suit.u Petitioners 
argue that this is an irrelevant difference because juries have 
bee11 biased against Bive·11s claimants. Reply Brief at 7, 
Brief at 30-31, u. 30. Significantly, however. they do not 
assert that judges tryiug the claims as FTCA actions would 
have been more receptive, and they caunot explain why the 
plain tiff should not retaiu the choice. 
8 Moreover, af1rr Carey punitive tlamag<•::; may be the oul~· significant 
remed~· availahle in some § 198:~ action;;: wheN· eon~titutional rights are 
ma.liriou,.;l~· violated but the victim eannot. prove comtwn:se~ble injury. 
u Petitiom•rs argur t.hat. thP availability of punitive damages or a jury 
trial under Biven~ i:; irrclrvanl brcau:sc nPither i:s a necessary elpmcnt of a 
rem{'(lial ~ehemr. But that argumrnt completPl)· mi:;,;C's the mark. The 
iS::~ue iH not. whrt brr a. Biven.s cause of action or nny one of it::; particular 
features i::; e::N•ntial. Hath<·r the in4uir~· i,.; whether CongrP>'!< ha,; rrerttrd 
whnt it. view::; as an equally elfedive rem(ldial ~rlwme. Otherwi::;e the two 
can rxi~t Hide by ~ide. Mon·owr, no ouc dilferencl' need independently 
rendPr FTCA inadequnte. l t. can fail to Lw equally effective on lhe 
cumulative baO>is of more than 011e difference. 
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Fourtl1. an action under FTCA exists only if the State in 
.,.,·hich the allrgf'cl misconduct occurred would permit a cause 
of action for that misconduct to go fonvard. 28 U. S. C. 
§ 1346 (h) (Filit<.'cl States liable "in accordance with the law 
of the place wiH•re the act or omission occurred."). Yet it is 
obvious that thf' liability of federal officials for violations 
of citi7.f'ns' constitutional rights should be· governed by uni-
form rulf':::.. ..'cc Part III. infra. The question whether re-
spondent's action for violations by federal officials of federal 
constitutional rights should be left to the vagaries of the laws 
of the S(•wral Rtatrs admits of only a negative answer iu the 
absence ol' a eo11trary congressional resolution. 
Plainly FTC'.\ is not a. sufficirnt wotector of the citizens' J ~~ 
constitutic>llal rights. and \Vithout a clear congressional mall- I' 
date m• cannot hold that Congress relC'gated respondent ex-
clusively to tlw FTC'A remedy. 
III 
Bivens actionR are a creation of ff'dera] Jaw a11d, therefore, 
t.ho qm•stion whether rC'spondcnt's action survivc:>d Jones' 
death i:-; a qu<>stion of fedrral law. See Burks Y. Lasker, 441 
~
U. R. 471, 47(:) ( HJ79). Petitioners. howc:>ver, would have us 
fashion a fr<kra1 rule of survivorship that incorporates the 
survivorship laws of the forum State, at least where the state 
law is not inconsistent with federal law. Respondent argues, 
on the other hand. that only f\mifonn federal rule of sur-
vivorship is compati e w1th t e goal o deterring federal 
offieials from infringing federal constitutional rights in tho 
manner alleg<'d in respondent's cotuplaint. We agree with re-
spondent. Whatever difficulty we might have resolving the 
question were the federal involvement less clear, we hold that 
only a uniform federal rule of survivorship wilTSi:lmce to 
rerucs. · the cuustitutionaT Ciepri vation he;; alleged and to 
protect agaiust rPpetition of such conduct. 
I 
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Iu short, we agree with and ado~~ the reasoning of the 
Court of Appeals, 581 F. 21, at 674-6 5 (footnote omitted): 
~ality of the survival of civil rights claims 
for complete villdication of constitutional rights is but-
tressed by the need for uniform treatment of those claims, 
at least where they are against federal officials. As this 
very case illustrates, uniformity cannot be achieved if 
courts arc limited to applicable state law. Here the role- ~ ~ 
va11t Itldiaml statute would not permit survival of the 
claint, \vhilt> in Beard [v. Robinson, 563 F. 2d 331 (CA7 
1977) .J th(' Illinois statute permitted survival of the 
I 
Bivens aetion. The liability of federal agents for viola-
tion of eonstitutional rights should not depend upon 
where the violatiou occurred .... -. In sum, we hold 
that whenever the rclPvant state survival statute would 
abate a Bivens-type action brought against defendants 
whose conduct results in death, the federal common law 
allows survival of the action." 
Robertson \". Wegmann, S'upra, holding that a § 1983 action 
would abate iu accordance with Louisiana survivorship law 
is not to the contrary. There the plaintiff's death was not 
caused by thp acts of the defendants upon which the suit was 
bascd. 10 Moreover, Robertson QXpresslsy recognized that to 
10 Robert~Oil r~~-<hionC'd it.-< holdiug U~' rPferencc to 42 u. s. c. § 1988 
which reqnircti tlmt ~ 191':3 aetion,; be govt>rned L.v 
"the comou la"·, a~< moditiPd and chnnged b~· the con::;titu1ion :md lmvs of 
tho S1ak whcrrin the court, having juritidirt.ion of !tho] civil ... c~msc 
is held, :<o J:tr as the ~;amo i~< noL incon~istent wiLh the Constitution rUld 
laws of tlH' !Jnitcd St.~tes." 
Section 108K doel'l not i11 (.crm~ apply Lo !Jivens aelions, and there are 
cogent n•aHOJJ~ not to appl~· iL to till<'h action:;; even by an;tlogy. Bivens 
def('nclant.s a ro fedrral officiab brought. into federal court for viohtting 
the Fetlt>ral Constitution . No stalr intpre"'ts arr implicnted by appl~·ing I 
pur<'ly federal Jaw to t lwm. Whil<' it rna kes some sense to aU ow asp<'cts 
of § 198:~ litigation to var.'· neconliug to the laws of the StatPs under 
whotie authority § 1!)83 rldcmlants work, federal officials have no l'limilar 
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prevent frustration of the detcrre11ce goals of § 1983 (which in 
part also u11derlie Bivens actions, see Part II, supra) "[a] 
state official ·contemplating illegal activity must always be 
prepared to face the prospect of a § 1983 action being filed 
against him." 436 U. S., at 592. A federal official contem- ~ 
plating unconstitutional conduct similarly must be prepared 
to face the prospect of a Bivens action. A m1ifonn rule that 
claims such as respondent's survive the decedent's death is 
essential if we are not to "frustrate in [an] important way 
the achievement" of the goals of Bivens actions. Auto 
Workers v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U. S. 696, 702-703 
(19uG).11 
Affirmed. 
claim to be bound only by t.he law of the State in which they happen to 
work. Bivens, 403 U. S., at. 409 (~arlan, J., concurring). Moreover, 
the><e petitionNs lt<LW l he power to tram; fer pri::;ouer;:; to facilitie:; in any 
ono of Rcvend Stat p,.; whirh may lmvo different rulrs governing :;urvivor-
ship or othrr ns])('rt,.; of the ra~e, tlwreby controlling to Home extent the 
law that would apply to t,hPir ow11 wronguoing. See Robertson, 436 
U. S., at 592-5!J:3, antl n. 10. Another m;pect of tho power to transfer 
pri:;oncrs freely within tho federal pri~on sy:slcm is that tlwre is no reason 
to expect thnt auy givcu pri;;oner will have any ties to the State in which 
he is incarremted, and, therefore, the Stnle will have litt.le intere::,t in 
having iti-1 law applied to tlmt. pri;;oner. Neverthc]e;;:-;, a:; to other ;;ur-~ 
vivorship questiou~ tlw,t may arise in Bivens actions, it may be thi~t the 
federal law Hhould choo~c to incorporate !>tate rule:;; a~ a matter of con-
venience. Wo leave such que::~tiom; for another day. 
11 Othcrwi~e, UJt offirial could know a,t, the t.imc he dE'cicled to act 
whether hi::; intrndecl virtim',- rlaim would survive. Cf. Auto Workers v. 
Hoosier Cnrdinal Corp., 315:3 U. S. 696 (100{)) (whether ;;tntute of limita,. 




TO: Mr. Justice Powell 
FROM: Ellen 
RE: No. 78-1261, Carlson v. Green I 
Mr. Justice Brennan's draft opinion for the Court bothers 
me for four reasons. (1) First, his discussion of the Bivens cause 
of action incorporates the same analysis you objected to in 
Passman. On p. 3-4, the governing principles are set out as 
follows: ~Jl , 4/ ~ -'-1 • 
/X ivens e~tabli ed that the victims of ~~ JA..., 
const1tut1onal iolation .•. have a r'gh o 
recover damage ••.. Such a cause o tion may be 
defeated . in two situations : i) . hen 
defendants onstrate "special factors ounselling 
hesitation the absence of affirmative action by 
ongress [, ( i i)] when defendants show that 
Congress has rovided an alternative remedy which it 
explicitly d clared ·to be a substitute for recovery 
directly und _r the Constitution and viewed as equally 
effective." (first emphasis added, second in 
original). 
Again, the Court ignores the rule that "federal courts must 
exercise a principled discretion when called upon to infer a 
private cause of action directly from the language fo the 
Constitution." (From your Passman dissent, p. 1). This case 
differs from Passman in that there is nothing that should lead the 
Court to reject the damages action. But I do not know that you 
want to join an opinion that so explicitly and affirmatively adopts 
the "right to damages" idea. 
2. 
(2) Second, Mr. Justice Brennan writes that alternative 
remedies will not be deemed to replace Bivens actions unless 
Congress "explicitly declare[s it] to be a substitute. II ( p. 
4) (emphasis in original). I doubt that this is true. Moreover, 
it is wholly irrelevant in this case, where Congress plainly didn't 
intend to replace Bivens actions. This congressional intent, like 
an explicit declaration, is relevant. But neither expressed intent 
nor the lack of it should be controlling. 
(3) Third, and less significant, the opinion omits what --I consider to be the most crucial reasons why the FTCA emedy is 
not adequate. Mr. Justice Brennan mentions that "an action under 
~
FTCA exists only if the State ... would permit a cause of action 
for that misconduct to go foraward." But he then says only that 
"it is obvious that the liability of federal officials ..• should 
be governed by uniform rules." That proposition - at least as 
broadly stated as it is in this opinion - is not obvious to me. 
The important point about the FTCA's reliance on state law is that 
i~the FTCA is not a federal remedial scheme - it merely waives 
~ sovereign immunity for existing tort claims. Nothing guarantees 
that the state law tort will bear any resemblance to the 
constitutional one, or that it will effectuate the policies 
underlying Bivens. That - not lack of uniformity - is the 
deficiency of the FTCA remedy. Moreover, Mr. Justice Brennan makes ..._______ 
no mention of the exceptions to the FTCA (Bench Memo, at 3-
4) which could reduce the availability of the remedy even below 
what exists under state law. 
3. 
(4) Fourth, Mr. Justice Brennan's view of the paramount 
importance of uniformity carries over into Part III, which implies 
in text that all the details of a Bivens action must be governed by 
uniform federal law. In particular, the language of the CA adopted 
by the Court in p. 9 is instructive: "The liability of federal 
agents for violation of constitutional rights should not depend 
upon where the violation occurred •.. " This bears a strong 
resemblance to the "outcome determinative" test once used in the 
Erie context, and, as such, is bound to be unworkable. Indeed, 
this reasoning would call into question settled law in the Courts 
of Appeals that the statute of limitations in Bivens actions is 
borrowed from state law. The footnote takes some of this back, 
stating that "it makes some sense to allow aspects of § 1983 
litigation to vary according to [State law]" and that "as to other 
survivorship questions ••• , it may be that the federal law should 
choose to incorporate state rules as a matter of convenience." 
(pp. 9-10 n. 10). 
Despite the footnote, I am worried about the broad 
language in the text. The opinion suggests that in Bivens actions 
there is a presumption favoring a uniform rule, which is directly 
opposite to the statutory presumption favoring state law in § 1983 
actions. 42 U.S.C. § 1988. This is contrary to the spirit of Butz 
v. Economou, in which the Court suggested it would be unseemly for 
federal officers to be governed by different rules than state 




adequately to deal with the contrary precedent in Robertson or to 
analyze, as the Court did in Robertson, the effect of applying 
state law on the policies underlying the constitutional cause of 
action. Indeed, the Court provides no real guidance for 
determining when state law might be "convenient" enouqh to override 
the uniformity interest. Although I could see holding that the 
state law in this case is too restrictive to further the federal 
policies, I do not agree that 
favor of federal common law. 
CONCLUSION: Points 
there should be a presumption in 
·~ 
~~LA-I~· 
/1 ---~ (2) and (3) are not serious. (2) 
could probably be worked out with language changes, and (3) mi~~ 
not be worth protesting about. (1) and (4) are more troubling.J On ___..... .....___,__.... 
the cause of action issue, I suppose you are now bound by Passman. 
But it might be worth writing separately to show that you need not 
use the "right to damages" analysis to reach this result. As to 
the the footnote and the outlandish result 
of reading the text literally may prevent any untoward results in 
future cases. I also believe that my reaction is colored by what 
seems to be back-of-the-hand treatment of a difficult issue. 
Accordingly, you may not feel that it is worth the trouble to say 
anything different on this point. On the other hand, I do believe 
that the language and analysis of the draft is way too broad, 
overstating the interest in uniformity and cutting a wide swath for 
federal common law where it is not necessary. The result is not as 
troubling in this case as it is where important State interests are 
5. 
at stake. Here, the State has no interest in applying its own law 
in federal constitutional actions. Rather, the problem is the 
judicial legislation inherent in adopting uniform federal rules as 
often and as broadly as this opinion suqqests. 
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Dear Bill: 
I shall await Bill Rehnquist's dissenting 
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January 4, 1980 
No. 78-1261 Carlson v. 
There are two issues: 
1. 
h . 'Jt#-tt:~--~  
.~. ~~ ....... -~~)4.ec.~ 
c t:.~~. ~tJ-,Iz, ~) - ~ 
~J ~~ L41..1 ~-
Green 
whether there shou~raP:tven~ ~n  
;/4¢'£.~ 
damages for deliberate medical mistreatment in violation of the ' 
~177.3 
Eighth Amendment, when the victim has an alternate remedy in the 
form of a malpractice action against the United States under the 
Federal Tort Claims Act? 
2. If there is such an action, whether survival of 
the action is governed by Indiana statutes that would bar this 
claim? 
I 
On the Bivens issue, my initial impression was that it 
is improper to allow plaintiffs to circumvent the procedures of 
2. 
the FTCA by alleging constitutional violations. The briefs have 
convinced me otherwise. As you pointed out in your concurrence 
in Davis v. Passman, a damages remedy is not constitutionally 
compelled for violations of all constitutional rights. Bivens 
itself looked to a variety of factors, and Justice VIlarlan 1 s 
concurrence suggested that the Court look to the same sorts of 
discretionary policies that a legislature might in fashioning a 
remedy. Brown v. General Services Administration, 425 u.s. 820 
(1976), looks in the same general direction, although Brown was 
a § 1981 action and accordingly looked primarily to 
congressional intent. 
The b~ seems to focus on the adequacy of 
alternative channels of enforcement to serve the policies of 
deterrence and compensation. The parties have somewhat muddled 
the role of congressional intent in this enteq>rise. I don 1 t 
believe that Congress could properly provide for an exclusive 
remedy unless the remedy was also constitutionally adequate. 
Conversely, the absence of explicit congressional intent to 
fashion an exclusive remedy is not controlling. For the same 
reasons, I doubt that Congress 1 intent to provide a parallel 
remedy would be absolutely controlling if the redundancy of the 
statutory and constitutional actions was apparent. However, the 
evidence -
atte~dy when it am~th~ FTCA_t~ co~ _:o~ts of 
harms alleged in that case is certainly relevant to the question 
whether the FTCA is in fact an effective alternative when 
3. 
constitutional rights have been violated. 
In this case, I think the SG misleads when he says 
that the FTCA is a "comprehensive remedial scheme for the kind 
of claim raised here." It is not. All the FTCA does is waive , . 
sovereign immunity and permit the recovery of damages against 
the United States "where • . a private person would be liable 
to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where 
the act or omission occurred." 28 u.s.c. § 1346 (b); see also 
28 U.S.C. § 2674. This isn't a federal remedial scheme at all. 
It remits the plaintiff entirely to his state law rights. 
Moreover, the FTCA gives the plaintiff even less than he would 
have under state law in many cases, because it is hedged with 
protections for the United States: 
1. The plaintiff cannot recover punitive damages. 
2. He is not entitled to trial by jury. 
3. The United States may well be entitled to use the 
good faith or qualified immunites provided by state law to 
protect individuals, not the state. Cf. Owen v. City of 
Independence. 
4. There is an exception for acts performed by 
employees "exercising due care in the execution of a statute or 
regulation, whether or not such statute or regulation is valid." 
(P 
28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) provision that would immunize many 
" 
constitutional violations. 
5. There is an exception for performance of "a 
7 
4. 
discretionary function or duty whether or not the 
discretion be abused," which exempts from liability all 
planning decisions. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S.15, 42 
(19530. 
6. The plaintiff must exhaust administrative remedies 
before coming to court. 
Not only is the plaintiff subject to "the vagaries of 
common law actions," Bivens, 403 U.S. at 409 (Harlan, J. 
concurring), but in some cases there will be no damages at all 





aspects of Bivens as~~ are not served to the same 
actions against the United States. The SG argues that 
purpose will be better served because officials will institute 
corrective action if liability is imposed upon the government 
itself. Whatever the validity of this argument, it rests on a 'IE' 
theory quite different from that underlying Bivens. 
Here as in Bivens, the interests protected by state 
laws regulating malpractice may be inconsistent with those 
served by the Eighth Amendment, for many of the same reasons 
stated in Bivens. 403 U.S., at 394. And the federal interest 
in uniformity is disserved by the FTCA remedy, which looks 
exclusively to the laws of the 50 states. In short, this is not 
a scheme specially adapted and designed with some 
modifications - to remedy a particular sort of constitutional 
violation, as was Title VII. See Brown v • GSA. It merely 
.............. , -,---- • ~ -.., -,--__......, rs;;-~ 
~~Uu_U.S. 
5. 
authorizes litigants to bring state law claims. Precisely the 
same situation prevailed in Bivens itself, except that the 
United States was not liable to suit. The addition of a solvent 
defendant to the picture should not change the result. Although 
the petitioner suggests that even Bivens should now come out the 
other way, Brief at 33, the alleviation of one of the concerns 
expressed in that decision does not seem to me to be 
controlling. Indeed, the fact that petitioner's logic 
inevitably leads to the abandonment of virtually all Bivens 
This conclusion is buttressed by the Congress' clear 
intention to preserve Bivens claims when it amended the FTCA in 
1974 to provide an additional remedy for the same conduct, see 
Respondent's brief at 35-36, by the repeated rejections 
Congress of attempts to amend the FTCA to substitute direct 
government liability for all individual liability in cases 
arising out of the performance of official duties, see Brief 
Amicus Curiae for the ACLU Foundation at 25-29, and by the 
concerns expressed by various congressmen that the FTCA remedy 
would be insufficient without substantial changes, see id. at 
26-27 and cf. Petitioner's Brief at 37 n. 38. 
The public policy concerns raised by the petitioner in 
the other direction are not persuasive. Brief at 38-39. The 
fact that a suit against ~e government should be preferable to 
the claimant is hardly a reason to deny him an alternative 





circumstances (as here) be preferable. Indeed, the usual 
superiority of an FTCA suit alleviates to some extent the 
"floodgates" concern so often expressed in these suits. The 
petitioner also says that substitution of government liability 
will benefit the public because the fear of personal liability 
and the burden of trial dampens the ardor of public officials. 
But the doctrines of qualified and absolute immunity were 
designed to meet precisely these concerns. We ought not to 
strike a different (and rather one-sided) balance here. 
Finally, there has been a suggestion that this 
question is not properly before us. Although it is true the 
question was not raised below and is not really related to the 
argument, made below, that no cause of action should be implied 
under the eighth amendment, it was the principal question on 
which the Court granted cert. It is a question of considerable 
importance and one to which the parties have devoted the lion's 
share of their briefing. There is no jurisdictional bar. 
Although the Court could properly refuse to consider the 
question, it would probably be preferable to reach it. 
II 
This issue raises no difficult theoretical questions. 
I am inclined to agree with the parties 
should generally be treated similarly to § 
that Bivens actions I 
1983 actions. See 
Butz v. Economou, 438 u.s. 478 (1978). Therefore Robertson v. 
Wegman, 436 U.S. 584 (1978) is the controlling law. Robertson 
7. 
says that state survival laws generally will govern 
constitutional damages actions against federal officials. But 
the holding there was: 
a narrow one, limited to situations in which no 
claim is made that state law generally is 
inhospitable to survival of § 1983 actions and in 
which the particular application of state 
survivorship law, while it~y cause abatement of 
the action, has no independent adverse effect on 
the ~licies undefTy1n9§ 198 T. ••• A d i'fferent 
situation m1ght well be presented . . . if state 
/
law 'did not provide for survival of any tort 
actions . . . . We intimate no view, moreover, 
about whether abatement . . . could be allowed in 
a situation in which deprivation of federal rights 
caused death. 
The debate in this case is over the applicability of 
the possible exceptions noted in Robertson, all of which seem to 
turn principally on an analysis of whether application of the 
state law of survival would frustrate the purposes of 
constitutional damages actions. The issues here are muddied by 
a dispute over the Indiana law. 
The petitioner says that all actions in Indiana 
"survive" to some extent. Although personal injury actions that 
cause a death do not "survive" in the sense that the victim's 
claim is completely abated, Indiana provides for a separate 
action for the victim's personal representative to sue in his 
own right or to recover damages for next of kin. This is in a 
legal sense a separate claim. But whether it should be treated 
differently for purposes of our analysis is not clear. The 
point should not be how the actions are labelled, for once the 
victim is dead the same people are likely to end up with the 
8. 
recovery whether the action be labelled "survival" or "wrongful / ~ 
death." As long as the constitutional claim of a deceased 
victim can be asserted in a wrongful death action, I would be 
inclined to take the petitioner's view and lump both actions 
together to see, in sum, what may be recovered. We do not know 
whether Indiana law would permit a constitutional claim to be 
brought under the wrongful death statute, but I have no reason 
to believe this would not be permissible. 
,) 
Accordingly, I will 
assume that damages would be available under Indiana law for the 
items provided in that statute. 
In the particular circumstances of this case, the ~ 
recovery provided for the allegedly unconstitutional death is~ 
lA ...... ~~r..-
But that is because the victim died 9......._t · woefully inadequate. ______. 
leaving no widow or dependent relative. _____, I 
~~~ 
doubt that the~··' -
would have any 4-~ ....,.. 
I 
limitation on damages in these circumstances 
significant effect on the policies underlying Bivens. As the~
petitioner points out, the survival of personal injury claims 
may often create a windfall to nondependent relatives or even 
unrelated heirs. At least, the policy of compensation is less 
compelling when the victim has died leaving no nuclear family or 
dependent relatives. 
The problem of deterrence is more troublesome. But 
the statutes, taken together, do not completely eliminate 
recoveries when the victim has died. Indeed, they significantly 
reduce recoveries only in the special circumstances presented 
here. I doubt that the prospect of "getting off" without 
9. 
damages liability when a prospective victim has no family would 
significantly affect the conduct of federal officials who know 
that in cases where the victim survives or leaves a widow or 
dependents he may have to answer in damages. 
I am somewhat troubled by this aspect of the case 
because it seems to place the Court at large to make predictive 
judgments as it sees fit on whether rules of law will 
"adequately" compensate or deter. Because I see no real 
in the creation of a federal rule of survivorship more 
than that provided by Indiana law, I would be inclined 
benefit ~ 
liberal~ 
to avoid ~ 
this exercise in creating common law rules in a  largely~~
Even though the Court has done so 
admiralty to a certain extent, Moragne v. States Marine Lines, ~ 
legislative area. 
Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 405-498 (1970), there are too many outright~ 
policy questions in fashioning survival and wrongful death ~ 
actions: Who is entitled to sue? For what items of damages? 
The absence of a body of common law precedent would seem to me ~ 
to make these questions excruciatingly difficult unless we look  
~~ 
~ 
to state law. For these reasons, I lean to reverse the CA7 and 
hold that the act ion was properly dismissed on the bas is of ri,. 
~ 
Indiana law. But I don't feel strongly one way or the other o
this question and could easily be persuaded the other way if 
there is some compelling reason to believe the policies 




On the first issue, I believe the FTCA cannot be 
interpreted as the exclusive remedy for the injury caused by the 
alleged constitutional violation in this case. If that result 
obtains in this case, it would be difficult to distinguish the 
whole array of Bivens actions - indeed, the SG's brief strongly 
suggests that he would now apply the same rule to the facts of 
Bivens itself. This logic 
actions entirely. While 
seems designed to eliminate Bivens 
the Bivens action arguably has 
contributed little to enforcement of constitutional obligations 
while clogging the courts with amorphous suits governed by no 
easily discernible laws, it would seem disingenuous to overrule 
it indirectly in the way proposed by the SG. 
On the second issue, the analysis is more 
straightforward but the result, in my view, less clear. I would 
lean to adopt the Indiana law of survivorship and reverse the 
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CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE w .. . .J . BRENNAN, .JR. January 10, 1980 
RE: No. 78-1261 Carlson v. Green 
Dear Chief: 
I'll undertake the opinion for the Court 
in the above. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
cc: The Conference 
lfp/ss 3/13/80 
78-~2l CARLSON v. GREEN 
v 
MR. JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in the 
judgment. 
Although I join the judgment, I do not 
agree with much of the language in the Court's 
opinion. The principles said to govern a Bivens 
cause of action are stated as follows: 
"Bivens established that the victims of a 
constitutional violation • have a 
right to recover damages • • Such a 
cause of action may be defeated • . • in 
two situations. The first is when 
defendants demonstrate 'special factors 
counselling hesitation in the absence of 
affirmative action by Congress' . .. , T~e 
second is when defendants show that 
Congress has provided an alternative 
remedy which is explicitly declared to be 
a substitute for recovery directly under 
the Constitution and viewed as egyall3 
ef£ect~" Ante, at 3-4 J (first emphasis 
added, second-rn-original). 
Much of the foregoing language is unnecessary 
dicta. Moreover, it goes beyond any prior holding 
by this Court. 
I 
We are concerned here with implying a 
(rv dJ Wfl 
of actio~ from the Constitution0wnen none is 
~I have thought that the b rden was on 
the party asserting such a I 
establish the inadequ~y or absence of other 
remedies (Ellen - if I am correct, please cite 





Ot!r (.P./;e;J ~ ~ b f- fl7lfYih. .fi/ 
-~w. 'pv,.c.fW dMw h~ 
~~ (f-
'Piie Coorl now would shi-i' tire- burden, ~nd ~~~~~~ 
require that a defendant show that Congress has ~) 
provided "an alternative remedy which it explicitly 
declared to be a substitute" for a Bivens cause of 
action, and that Congress viewed its remedy "as 
equally effective". These are unnecessarily 
\ 
inflexible conditions. ~or does the Court suggest 
any policy consideratio~for imposing such a 
threshold burden on a defendant in an implied 
r / 
remedy case. ( If the Court's language is taken 
literally, the question is not merely whether 
Congress has prescribed an adequate remedy. Even 
{f' 
iisuch a remedy is entirely adequate, the defendant 
also must show that Congress has "explicitly 
declared (its remedy] to be a substitute for --------
recovery directly under the Constitution". 
Absent such an explicit showing, the 
Court apparently thin~s a Bivens plaintiff may 
0 
ignore an a~uate congressional remedy. It ~ 
makes no sense, in such a situation, to afford a 
plaintif~ choice of two federal remedies, 
especially where one is implied and the other 
3. 
affirmatively provided by Congress. Moreouer, ~uch 
a rule would ~ke irreleva~other evidence of 
CVl' 1'- r OJ ~..~ I ~ -J.ui, cr t.v-e \ (2k'c'J2 l 1~ 
congressional intent. I also view it as 
c 
presumptuous ~ instruct Congress on the form as 
well as the substance of its legislation. 
t 
The Cour;rdoes state that a Bivens cause 
of action may be defeated if a defendant 
demonstrates "special factors" counseling 
hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by 
\~1c~rl1 Jl 
Congress. But no guidance i S-afforded by the 
\ \! c I I ( Gl L-1' I I I I 
~ op1nion - as to this possiol J except ~on. It 
'/& 
states simply that no snch :Eae-t-e-rSare present in 
this case, and that petitioners enjoy no 
(\ 
" 1dependent status" that would make "judicially ;\~'\..AC' 
(§·~ 
created remedies against them inappropriate". Aph~ 
~~~ ,Q~r:- t<> ~ ~ficia~'~:a~~s ~ f the def~n~aftt 
f'J\Q k ()._ \\ '"' 
is 'mmediately diluted ~ b¥ ~the sentence that 
follows -In it ') the Court states that even if 1 
l defending a Bivens suit "might inhibit [performance 
of] official duties, the qualified immunity 
lA 
accorded ••• under Butz v. Economo J .•• 
(\ 
provides adequte protection". 
'\ 
In sum, the Court identifies no special 
4. 
factors relevant to its purported exception. 
cwJvcrvl (> c~ , 
eagerness of this Court to impTy federal cause& of 
"'«etioll that are authorized neither by the 
Constitution nor by Congress is, in my view, a 
disservice both to the doctrine of separation of 
~ 




(Ellen, add a cite to my dissent in Cannon, and 
11 
possibly other cites). 
~ 
II 
This is not 
~A 
to~ hat in appropriate 
circumstances private causes of action may ~ be 
inferred from provisions of the Constitution. i-(L-/2. (!) Z.SZ.. 1 
ly 
(Ellen: cite my Passman disssent). Thy Court ~ 
\ recognized, Bivens, supra, at 397, and this Court 
K5.1 
again today acknowledges, that Congress is the 
appropriate body to create federal remedies. 
Althouqh the Court's opinion imposes new 
requirements as to when a congressionally 
prescribed remedy supplants the right to bring a 
Bivens suit, the Court has never gone so far as to 
say that Congress cannot provide an exclusive 
remedy. This being so, logic would require that -
absent congressional action - a federal court in 
5. 
deciding whether to imply a remedy should exercise 
the sort of discretion that one would expect from a 
legislative body. As Mr. Justice Harlan noted, a 
court should "take into account [a range of policy 
considerations] at least as broad as the range of 
those a legislature would consider with respect to 
an express statutory authorization of a traditional 
remedy". Bivens, supra, at 407. It is difficult 
to know from today's decision, written in 
absolutist terms, whether the "discretion" of a 
court is now reduced to determining simply whether 
there is a legislative remedy that both comports 
in substance and form with the Court's new 
requirements. 
Despite my serious disagreement with 
languaqe of the opinion, I do agree with the 
Court's conclusion that this is a proper case for a 
Bivens cause of action. The Federal Tort Claims 
Act, relied upon by petitioner, does not provide an 
y 
adequte remedy*; indeed, as the 
*Ellen, Include a summary note as to why the 
statutory remedy is inadequate. 
(1 
Court points out, the legislative history makes 
reasonably clear that Congress did not intend } O 
st<J.s\ a..+-M v 
( ·he LJ 




cens iderat ions --to the eentr ar-J ha~ been identified 
by any of the parties. 
III 
In part III of its opinion, the Court -
adopting the reasoning of the Court of Appeals -
holds that "whenever the relevant state survival 
statute would abate a Bivens-type action brought 
against defendants whose conduct results in death, 
the federal common law allows survival of the 
action." Ante, at 9. 
p lA ·p (/)I'~ 
I agree that ~elevant 
t f-?Jlv"&vv) a,_~,. 1 c...._ 
policy 
consideration) require the application of ~deral 
1 Ow IUJ \r Cl-~~ 
common law to allow survival in this case. _ Thgre 
. is 1 angnage in th~ . opi n i QJ:l.-y however, t~~!l_;e,.~~ 1 t..a ~1fo~ _A 
- ~ , ~ c Y fCVOJNI.i t.tt~A ·, Q L . _p t~~' dJ~ r.lA;v \ vJ oc.R.£7' J 
r h . /' . . , _,_._, t ~ t a 1n B1vens act1ons ge.n.e-ra-r .... i, L Iere- ' 
L. 
C sbonl d ..ae (a uniform federal rule. It is not clear 
----.::.:. 
to me that the Court would go this far. See n. 10, 
p. 9-10, infra, and it would be quite unnecessary 
in this case to adopt any such uniform rule. 
7. 
Moreover, this would be incompatible with the 
statutory presumption favoring state law in §1983 
actions. 42 U.S.C. §1988. It also would be 
contrary to the spirit of Butz v. Economou in which 
the Court indicated that it would be unseemly for 
federal officers to be governed by different rules 
than state officers. At least, where statutes of 
limitation are at issue, I have thought it settled 
that in both Bivens and 1983 actions the federal 
courts applied state statutes of limitations. 
(Ellen: cite a case or two). 
lfp/ss 3/13/80 
78-1621 CARLSON v. GREEN 
MR. JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in the 
judgment. 
Although I join the judgment, I do not 
agree with much of the language in the Court's 
opinion. The principles said to govern a Bivens 
cause of action are stated as follows: 
"Bivens established that the victims of a 
constitutional violation • have a 
right to recover damages • • Such a 
cause of action may be defeated ••. in 
two situations. The first is when 
defendants demonstrate 'special factors 
counselling hesitation in the absence of 
affirmative action by Congress'. The 
second is when defendants show that 
Congress has provided an alternative 
remedy which is explicitly declared to be 
a substitute for recovery directly under 
the Constitution and viewed as equally 
effective." Ante, at 3-4 (first emphasis 
added, second-rn-original). 
Much of the foregoing language is unnecessary 
dicta. Moreover, it goes beyond any prior holding 
by this Court. 
I 
We are concerned here with implying a 
cause of action from the Constitution when none is 
specified. I have thought that the burden was on 
the party asserting such a right at least to 
establish the inadequacy or absence of other 
remedies (Ellen - if I am correct, please cite 
2. 
cases). 
The Court now would shift the burden, and 
require that a defendant show that Congress has 
provided "an alternative remedy which it explicitly 
declared to be a substitute" for a Bivens cause of 
action, and that Congress viewed its remedy "as 
equally effective". These are unnecessarily 
inflexible conditions. Nor does the Court suggest 
any policy considerations for imposing such a 
threshold burden on a defendant in an implied 
remedy case. If the Court's language is taken 
literally, the question is not merely whether 
Congress has prescribed an adequate remedy. Even 
i~uch a remedy is entirely adequate, the defendant 
also must show that Congress has "explicitly 
declared [its remedy] to be a substitute for 
recovery directly under the Constitution". 
Absent such an explicit showing, the 
Court apparently thinks a Bivens plaintiff may 
ignore an adquate congressional remedy. It simply 
makes no sense, in such a situation, to afford a 
plaintif;!a choice of two federal remedies, 
especially where one is implied and the other 
3. 
affirmatively provided by Congress. Moreover, such 
a rule would make irrelevant other evidence of 
congressional intent. I also view it as 
presumptuous to instruct Congress on the form as 
well as the substance of its legislation. 
The Court does state that a Bivens cause 
of action may be defeated if a defendant 
demonstrates "special factors" counseling 
hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by 
~k.eJ-'3. _ , 
Congress. But no guidance is afforded by the-
!\ 
Cotn·t '...s -apinig.n as to this possible exception. It 
states simply that no such factors are present in 
this case, and that petitioners enjoy no 
"idependent status" that would make "judicially 
~,J if-
created remedies against them inappropriate". This 
A 
reference to the official status of the defendant 
is immediately diluted by the sentence that 
follows. In it, the Court states that even if 
defending a Bivens suit "might inhibit (performance 
of] official duties, the qualified immunity 
accorded •.• under Butz v. Economos .•• 
(j...J 
provides adequ~e protect ion". 
In sum, the Court identifies no special 
4. 
factors relevant to its purported exception. The 
eagerness of this Court to imply federal causes of 
action that are authorized neither by the 
Constitution nor by Congress is, in my view, a 
disservice both to the doctrine of separation of 
powers and to a rational system of justice. 
(Ellen, add a cite to my dissent in Cannon, and 
possibly other cites). 
II 
This is not to say that in appropriate 
circumstances private causes of action may not be 
inferred from provisions of the Constitution. 
(Ellen: cite my Passman disssent). The Court 
~ 
recognized)\ Bivens, supra, at 397, and this Court 
again today acknowledges, that Congress is the 
appropriate body to create federal remedies. 
Although the Court's opinion imposes new 
requirements as to when a congressionally 
prescribed remedy supplants the right to bring a 
Bivens suit, the Court has never gone so far as to 
say that Congress cannot provide an exclusive 
remedy. This being so, logic would require that -
absent congressional action - a federal court in 
5. 
deciding whether to imply a remedy should exercise 
the sort of discretion that one would expect from a 
legislative body. As Mr. Justice Harlan noted, a 
court should "take into account [a range of policy 
considerations] at least as broad as the range of 
those a legislature would consider with respect to 
an express statutory authorization of a traditional 
remedy". Bivens, supra, at 407. It is difficult 
to know from today's decision, written in 
absolutist terms, whether the "discretion" of a 
court is now reduced to determining simply whether 
there is a legislative remedy that both comports 
in substance and form with the Court's new 
requirements. 
Despite my serious disagreement with 
language of the opinion, I do agree with the 
Court's conclusion that this is a proper case for a 
Bivens cause of action. The Federal Tort Claims 
Act, relied upon by petitioner, does not provide an 
adequte remedy*; indeed, as the 
*Ellen, 1nclude a summary note as to why the 
statutory remedy is inadequate. 
6. 
Court points out, the legislative history makes 
reasonably clear that Congress did not intend to 
foreclose a Bivens suit. Moreover, no policy 
considerations to the contrary have been identified 
by any of the parties. 
III 
In part III of its opinion, the Court -
adopting the reasoning of the Court of Appeals -
holds that "whenever the relevant state survival 
statute would abate a Bivens-type action brought 
against defendants whose conduct results in death, 
the federal common law allows survival of the 
action." Ante, at 9. 
I agree that relevant policy 
considerations require the application of a federal 
common law to allow survival in this case. There 
is language in the opinion, however, that seems to 
suggest that in Bivens actions generally, there 
should be a uniform federal rule. It is not clear 
to me that the Court would go this far. See n. 10, 
p. 9-10, infra, and it would be quite unnecessary 
in this case to adopt any such uniform rule. 
7. 
Moreover, this would be incompatible with the 
statutory presumption favoring state law in §1983 
actions. 42 U.S.C. §1988. It also would be 
contrary to the spirit of Butz v. Economou in which 
the Court indicated that it would be unseemly for 
federal officers to be governed by different rules 
than state officers. At least, where statutes of 
limitation are at issue, I have thought it settled 
that in both Bivens and 1983 actions the federal 
courts applied state statutes of limitations. 
(Ellen: cite a case or two). 
.;§u:punu <!Juttrl uf flrt ~tth .;§httt.G' 
~a~Jrittgtun.tll. (!f. 2.0,?J!.$ 
CHAM BE RS Or 
.JUSTICE .JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
March 13, 1980 
Re: 78~1261 ~ • Carlson• v. Gre~n 
Dear Bill: 
Please join me. 
Respectfully, 
fJL 
Mr. Justice Brennan 






Carlson v. Green 
Dear Bill: 
Althouqh I 
your opinion for the Court. 
Passman, and your draft 
- the Passman analysis. 
I will await 
decidinq what to do. 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
lfp/ss 
cc: The Conference 
am not able to join 
we went too far in 
- perhaps understandably 
dissent before 
Court • ' 
~~, 




78-1261 CARLSON v. GREEN 
MR. JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in the 
judgment. 
Although I join the judgment, I do not 
agree with much of the language in the Court's 
opinion. The Court states the principles 
governing Bivens actions as follows: 
Court. 
"Bivens established that the victims of a 
const1tutional violation • have a 
right to recover damages . . Such a 
cause of action may be defeated • • • in 
two situations. The first is when 
defendants demonstrate 'special factors 
counselling hesitation in the absence of 
affirmative action by Congress •.•. The 
second is when defendants show that 
Congress has provided an alternative 
remedy which is explicitly declared to be 
a substitute for recovery directly under 
the Constitution and viewed as equally 
effective. • • " Ante, at 3-4 (emphasis 
in original). 
holdings of this 
I 
We are concerned here with implying a 
right of action for damages directly from the 
Constitution. In the past, the Court has said that 
persons who have "no [other] effective means of 
redress" "must be able to invoke the existing 
jurisdiction of the courts for the protection of 
2. 
their justiciable constitutional rights." Davis v. 
Passman, 442 u.s. 228, 242 (1979). The Davis rule 
in itself ~Flfines the "principled discretion" that 
"" 
should be brought to bear when a court is asked to 
infer a private cause of action not specified by 
the enacting authority. Id., at 252 (POWELL, J., 
dissenting). 
15 ~IJ. ~ i L I ' 
But the Court ..s.e~-. b.enL o.n 
' ... \ 
eliminat~ every vestige of discretion. Today we 
are tol d that a court must entertain a Bivens suit 
unless the action is "defeated" in one of tw6 
specified ways. 
The Court recognized in Bivens that the 
need for implied remedies may be obviated when 
Congress has supplied "equally effective 
alternative remedies." Id., at 248; see Bivens v. 
Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 u.s. 388, 
397 (1971). 
defendant cannot defeat a Bivens action simply by 
showing that there are adequate alternative avenues 
of relief. The defendant must also show that 
Congress "explicitly declared [its remedy] to be a 
substitute for recovery directly under the 
Constitution and viewed [it] as equally effective." 
3. 
These are unnecessarily inflexible conditions. The 
l 
policy reason - indeed no reason 
at all - for imposing this threshold burden upon 
the defendant in an implied remedy case. 
The Court implicitly acknowledges that 
Congress possesses the power to enact adequate 
alternative remedies that would be exclusive. Yet, 
today's . ~11 ~ . 1. 'ff op1n1on w1 per;;~ B1vens p a1nt1 s to 
" ignore entirely adequate remedies if Congress has 
~ 
not clothed them in the ~linguistic garb. No 
purpose is served by affording plaintiffs a choice 
of remedies in these circumstances. 
~~~;~ 
Nor dees it 
courts to close their eyes 
t . 1' h ~ d' o congress1ona 1ntent t at 1 not~expresse 1n 
~~hi prefers. Indeed, I would 
have thought it presumptuous for this Court to 
instruct Congress on the form its legislation must 
take. 
The Court does state that the Bivens 
remedy may be defeated if "special factors" counsel 
hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by 
Congress. But no further guidance is provided. 
The Court states simply that no such factors are 
4. 
present in this case, and that petitioners enjoy no 
"independent status" that would make judicially 
created remedies inappropriate. Ante, at 4. The 
implication that official status may be a "special 
factor" is withdrawn in the sentence that follows, 
which concludes that qualified immunity affords all 
the protection necessary to the effective 
performance of official duties. No other factors 
relevant to the purported exception are mentioned. 
One is left to wonder whether judicial 
discretion in this area will hereafter be confined 
to the single determination that a legislative 
remedy does or does not comport with the 
specifications prescribed by this Court. Such a 
drastic curtailment of discretion would be 
inconsistent with the Court's longstanding 
recognition that Congress is ultimately the 
appropriate body to create federal remedies. See 
ante, at 4-5; Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics 
Agents, supra, 403 u.s., at 397. A plaintiff who 
seeks his remedy directly under the Constitution 
asks the federal courts to perform an essentially 
legislative task. As Mr. Justice Harlan once said, 
5. 
a court should "take into account [a range of 
policy considerations] at least as broad as the 
range of those a legislature would consider with 
respect to ~n express statutory authorization of a 
-traditional remedy". Bivens, supra, at 407. I do 
not understand why this discretion must be limited 
in the manner announced today. 
The Court's absolutist language is the 
more puzzling for its adoption in a case where the 
implied remedy is so plainly appropriate under any 
measure of di~cretion. The Federal Tort Claims 
Act, relied on by petitioners, simply is not an 
adequate remedy.l/ And there are reasonably clear 
indications that Congress did not intend that 
statute to displace Bivens claims. See ante, at 4-
5. No substantial contrary policy has been 
identified, and I am aware of none. I therefore 
agree that a private damages remedy properly is 
inferred from the Constitution in this case. But I 
do not agree that Bivens plaintiffs have a "right" 
to this remedy whenever the defendant fails to make 
the showing required today. In my view, the Court's 
eagerness to imply federal causes of action that 
6. 
cannot be found in Constitution or statute is an 
affront to the doctrine of separation of powers and 
a disservice to a rational system of justice. Cf. 
Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 u.s. 677, 730-
749 (POWELL, J., dissenting).2/ 
II 
In part III of its opinion, the Court 
holds that "'whenever the relevant state survival 
statute would abate a Bivens-type action brought 
against defendants whose conduct results in death, 
the federal common law allows survival of the 
action.'" ~,at 9, quoting 581 F.2d, at 674-
675. I agree that the relevant policies require 
the application of federal common law to allow 
-survival in this case. 
It is not [s g "obvious" to me that "the 
liability of federal officials for violations of 
citizens' constitutional rights should be governed 
by uniform rules" in every case. Ante at BJ see 
id., at 9. On the contrary, federal courts 
routinely refer to state law to fill the procedural 
gaps in national remedial schemes. The policy 
against invoking the federal common law except 
7. 
where necessary to the vitality of a federal claim 
is codified in 42 U.S.C. § 1988, which creates a 
presumption in favor of state law in § 1983 
actions. 
The Court's opinion in this case stops 
short of mandating uniform rules to govern all 
aspects of Bivens actions. Ante, at 9-10 n. 10. 
But it appears designed - at the least - to reverse 
in Bivens actions the presumption applicable under 
§ 1983. The distinction is both unnecessary to the 
analysis of this case and contrary to the spirit of 
Butz v. Economou, 438 u.s. 478, 498-504 & n. 25 
(1978). In Butz, the Court indicated that it would 
be unseemly for different rules to govern the 
liability of federal and state officers for the 




~/ The FTCA is not a federal remedial 
scheme at all, but a waiver of sovereign immunity 
that permits an injured claimant to recover damages 
against the United States "where ••• a private 
person would be liable to the claimant in 
accordance with the law of the place where the act 
or omission occurred." 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)~ see 
also 28 U.S.C. § 2674. Here, as in Bivens itself, 
a plaintiff who is denied his constitutional remedy 
would be remitted to the vagaries of state law. See 
403 U.S., at 394-395. The FTCA gives the plaintiff 
even less than he would receive under state law in 
many cases, because the statute is hedged with 
protections for the United States. As the Court 
points out, neither punitive damages nor jury trial 
are available under the FTCA. Ante, at 7-8. And 
recovery may be barred altogether if the claim 
involves a "discretionary function," 28 u.s.c. § 
2679(a), or "the execution of a statute or 
regulation, whether or not such statute or 
regulation is valid," 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a). 
FN2. 
~/ I do not imply that courts enjoy the 
same degree of freedom to imply causes of action 
from statutes as they do from the Constitution. 
See Davis v. Passman, 442 u.s. 228, 241-242 (1979). 
I do believe, however, that the Court has seriously 
overstepped the bounds of rational judicial 
decisionmaking in both contexts. 
er 3/18/80 
78-1261 CARLSON v. GREEN 
MR. JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in the 
judgment. 
Although I join the iudgment, I do not 
" I t " Yl • 
agree with much of the language in the Court's 
opinion. The Court states the principles 
governing Bivens actions as follows: 
"Bivens established that the victims of a 
const1tutional violation . have a 
right to recover damages .• Such a 
cause of action may be defeated • • . in 
two situations. The first is when 
defendants demonstrate 'special factors 
counselling hesitation in the absence of 
affirmative action by Congress! ••. The 
second is when defendants show that 
Congress has provided an alternative 
re~ wh1ch ~ explicitly declared to be 
a substitute fSr recovery directly under 
the Constitution and viewed as equally 
effective. • • " Ante, at 3-4 (emphasis 
in original). ----
tl... ;> 
The foregoing statement contains dicttm ' that goes 
well beyond the prior holdings of this Court. 
I 
We are concerned here with 
right of action for damages directly from the 
Constitution. In the past, the Court has said that 
persons who have "no [other] effective means of 
redress" "must be able to invoke the existing 
jurisdiction of the courts for the protection of 
their justiciable constitutional rights." Davis v. 
2. 
I 
Passman, 442 u.s. 228, 242 (1979). The Davis rule 
now sets the boundaries of the "principled 
discretion" that must be brought to bear when a 
court is asked to infer a private cause of action 
j 
not specified by the enacting authority. ~·, at 
252 (POWELL, J., dissenting). But the Court's 
opinion, read literally, would restrict that 
discretion dramatically. Today we are told that a 
court must entertain a Bivens suit unless the 
action is "defeated" in one of two specified ways. 
As the Court recognized in Bivens, the 
need for implied remedies may be obviated when 
Congress has supplied "equally effective 
alternative remedies." Id., at 248; see Bivens v. 
Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 u.s. 388, 
397 (1971). The Court now volunteers the view that 
a defendant cannot defeat a Bivens action simply by 
showing that there are adequate alternative avenues 
of relief. The defendan~ show that 
Congress "explicitly declared [its remedy] to be a 
substitute for recovery directly under the .J 4 ( ~wrt,~ ,;. 
~ ill\ o'l-'4,-t.-"'-e.J 
[i,t~ as equally effective." )-----~ Constitution and viewed 
01.(1' / /\ 
These are unnecessarily 'nfl~e conditions. The 
3. 
Court cites no authority and advances no policy 
reason - indeed no reason at all - for imposing 
this threshold burden upon the defendant in an 
implied remedy case. 
The Court ~licitly acknowledg~ 
that Congress possesses the power to enact adequate 
alternative remedies that would be exclusive. Yet, 
today's opinion apparently will permit Bivens 
plaintiffs to ignore entirely adequate remedies if 
Congress has not clothed them in the prescribed 
linguistic garb. No purpose is served by affording 
plaintiffs a choice of remedies in these 
circumstances. Nor do our prior cases require 
federal courts to close their eyes to congressional 
intent that may not be expressed in the language we 
prescribe. Indeed, I would have thought it 
presumptuous for this Court to instruct Congress on 
e~f(_ / 
theA fo~its legislation must take. 
A defendant may also defeat the Bivens 
remedy under today's decision if "special factors" 
counsel hesitation in the absence of affirmative 
action by Congress. But the Court supplies no 
0~ f~ ,~J-
further ~ opinion states simply that 
4. 
no such factors are present in this case, and th~ S(~ 
Q"'- o(..Vt f"• s ) 
petitioners enjoy no "independent statu~• that 
would make judicially created remedies 
inappropriate. Ante, at 4. The implication that 
- ~ 
official status} may be a "special factor" is 
withdrawn in the sentence that follows, which 
concludes that qualified immunity affords all the 
en~../ 
protection necessary to) the effective performance 
of official duties. No other factors relevant to 
the purported exception are mentioned. 
One is left to wonder whether judicial 
discretion in this area will hereafter be confined 
to the single determination that a legislative 
remedy does or does not comport with the 
specifications prescribed by this Court. Such a 
drastic curtailment of discretion would be 
inconsistent with the Court's longstanding 
recognition that Congress is ultimately the 
appropriate body to create federal remedies. See 
ante, at 4-5; Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics 
Agents, supra, 403 u.s., at 397. A plaintiff who 
seeks his remedy directly under the Constitution 
asks the federal courts to perform an essentially 
5. 
legislative task. Justice Harlan once said, 
a court should "take into account [a range of 
policy considerations] at least as broad as the 
range of those a legislature would consider with 
respect to an express statutory authorization of a 
/ 
traditional remed~Bivens, supra, at 407. I do 
~ \S . .., ~ ./"? 
not understand why this discretion ~be limited 




l~d more puz zl in ~ 
Court's absolu~ language i~ 
f.Gr\J~~d~;:~ in a case where the 
implied remedy is so plainly appropriate under any 
measure of discretion. The Federal Tort Claims 
Act, relied on by petitioners, simply is not an 
adequate remedy.1/ And there are reasonably clear 
indications that Congress did not intend that 
statute to displace Bivens claims. See ante, at 4-
5. No substantial contrary policy has been 
identified, and I am aware of none. I therefore 
agree that a private damages remedy properly is 
inferred from the Constitution in this case. But I 
do not agree that Bivens plaintiffs have a "right" 
to this remedy whenever the defendant fails to make 
the showing required today. In my view, the Court's 
6. 
. r 7 
, 
eagerness to imply federal causes of action that 
cannot be found in Constitution or statute is an 
affront to the doctrine of separation of powers and 
a disservice to a rational system of justice. Cf. 
Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 u.s. 677, 730-
{:1'1 
J. , dissenting) .]:j 
II 
In part III of its opinion, the Court 
holds that "'whenever the relevant state survival 
statute would abate a Bivens-type action brought 
against defendants whose conduct results in death, 
the federal common law allows survival of the 
action.'" Ante, at 9, quoting 581 F.2d~4-
~ 
6t~. ~ agree that the relevant policies require 
the application of federal common law to allow 
survival in this case. 
It is not "obvious" to me, however, that 
"the liability of federal officials for violations 
of citizens' constitutional rights should be 
governed by uniform rules" in every case. Ante at 
8: see id., at 9. On the contrary, federal courts 
routinely refer to state law to fill the procedural 
gaps in national remedial schemes. The policy 
7. 
against invoking the federal common law except 
where necessary to the vitality of a federal claim 
is codified in 42 u.s.c. § 1988, which creates a 
presumption in favor of state law in ~ 1983 
actions. 
The Court's opinion in this case stops 
short of mandating uniform rules to govern all 
aspects of Bivens actions. Ante, at 9-10 n. 10. 
But it appears designed - a~t e least - to reverse 
I (J. <L< I offic.vu~ I J 
~ J ~ ------ \ \ I~ 
in Bivens actions) the presumption a~p~p~l~t8c~a~bb±l€c-uanaer + ~ 
( .;u...;l$' ~(AA A<t $-t'). ~.t '.-f-1'/.J t j-1",. I~J.AJ 'Sk - • t-ulu\.t /~l~-1_; 
§ 198) . The distinct .i:en is both unnecessary to the 
nu·,. '!" ( r 
analysis of this case and contrary to the spirit of 
Butz v. Economou, 438 u.s. 478, 498-504 & n. 25 
(1978). In~, the Court indicated that it would 
be unseemly for different rules to govern the 
liability of federal and state officers for the 
\5\l~liJ,..-- Sf/ 





11 The FTCA is not a federal remedial 
scheme at all, but a waiver of sovereign immunity 
that permits an injured claimant to recover damages 
against the United States "where ••• a private 
pers~d be liable to the claimant in 
accordance with the law of the place where the act 
or omission occurred." 28 u.s.c. § 1346(b): see 
v also 28 U.S.C. § 2674. Here, as in Bivens itself, 
a plaintiff who is denied his constitutional remedy 
would be remitted to the vagaries of state law. See 
vi 403 U.S., at 394-395. The FTCA gives the plaintiff 
even less than he would receive under state law in 
many cases, because the statute is hedged with 
protections for the United States. As the Court 
points out, neither punitive dama~s/ nor ~ury trial 
--;, 
) s "'\-
1 care /available under the FTCA. Ante, at7~ -
recovery may be barred altogether if the claim 
involves a "discretionary function" or "the 
execution of a statute or regulation, whether or 
not such statute or regulation is valid." 28 
u.s.c. § 2680(a). 
FN2. 
\ 5~tVJ1~v 
~/ I do not ~ that courts enjoy the 
same degree of freedom to \~~uses of action 
from statutes as they do from the Constitution. 
See Davis v. Parsman, 442 u.s. 228, 241-242 (1979). ~ 
I do believe, however, that the 
overstepped the bounds of rational judicial 
decisionmaking in both contexts. 
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MR. JusTICE PowELL, concurring in the judgment. 
Although I join the judgment, I do not agree with much 
of the language in the Court's opinion. The Court states 'the 
principles governing Bivens actions as follows! 
"Bivens established that the victims of a constitutional 
violation ... have a right to recover damages. . . . Such 
a cause of action may be defeated ... in two situations. 
'The first is when defendants demonstrate 'special factors 
counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action 
by Congress.' . . . The second is when defendants 
show that Congress has provided an alternative remedy 
which it explicitly declared to be a substitute for recovery 
directly under the Constitution and viewed as equally 
effective .... " Ante, at 3-4 (emphasis in original). 
The foregoing statement contains dicta that go well beyond 
the prior holdings of this Court. 
I 
We are concerned here with inferring a right of action for 
damages directly from the Constitution. In Davis v. Pass-\ 
man, 442 U. S. 228, 242 ( 1979), the Court said that persons 
who have "no [other] effective means of redress" "must be 
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able to invoke the existing jurisdiction of the courts for the 
protection of their justiciable constitutional rights." A The 
Davis rule now sets the boundaries of the "principled discre~ 
tion" that must be brought to bear when a court is asked to 
infer a private cause of action not specified b aut ority. 
!d., at 252 (PowELL, J., dissenting). But the Court's opinion, 
read literally, would restrict that discretion dramatically. 
Today we are told that a court must entertain a Bivens suit 
unless the action is "defeated" in one of two specified ways. 
Bivens recognized that implied remedies may be unneces~ 
sary when Congress has ~'equa y effective;'-alterna~ 
tive remedies. Bivens v. Si~-Un"known Fed. Narcotics Agents, 
403 U. S. 388, 397 (1971); see Davis v. Passman, supra, 442 
U. S., at 248. The Court now volunteers the view that a de~ 
fendant cannot defeat a Bivens action simply by showing that 
there are adequate alternative avenues of relief. The de:-
fendant also must show that Congress "explicitly declared 
[its remedy] to be a substitute for recovery directly under the 
Constitution and viewed [it] as equ·ally effective." Ante, at 
4 (emphasis in original). These are unnecessarily rigid con~ 
ditions. The Court cites no authority and advances no policy 
reason-indeed no reason at all-for imposing this threshold! 
burden upon the defendant in an implied remedy case. 
The Court does implicitly acknowledge that Congress 
possesses the power to enact adequate alternative remedies 
that would be exclusive. Yet, today's opinion apparently will 
permit Bivens plaintiffs to ignore entirely adequate remedies 
if Congress has not clothed them in the prescribed linguistic 
garb. No purpose is served by affording plaintiffs a choice of 
remedies in these circumstances. Nor clo OY+ fl~io~ eases'"" 
~ federal courts to blind themselves to congressional 
intent expressed in language other than that which we 
prescribe. 
A defendant also ma.y defeat the Bivens remedy under 
today's decision if "special factors" counsel "hesita.tion." But 
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opinion states simply that no such factors are present in this 
case. The Court says that petitioners enjoy no "independent I 
status in our constitutional scheme" that would make judi- (~ 
cially ereated remedies inappropriate. Ante, at 4. Bu!}mpli-1 L 
cation that official status may be a "special factor" IS with-
drawn in the sentence that follows, which concludes that 
qualified immunity affords all the protection necessary to 
ensure the effective performance of official duties. No other 
factors relevant to the purported exception are mentioned. 
One is left to wonder whether judicial discretion in this area 
will hereafter be confined to the question of alternative reme- I 
dies, which is in turn reduced to the single determination that 
congressional action does or does not comport with the specifi-
cations prescribed by this Court. Such a drastic curtailment 
of discretion would be inconsistent with the Court's long-
standing recognition that Congress is ultimately the appro-
priate body to create federal remedies. See ante, at 4-5; 
Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, supra, 403 
U. S., at 397. A plaintiff who seeks his remedy directly under 
the Constitution asks the federal courts to perform an essen-
tially legislative task. In this situation, as Mr. Justice Harlan 
once said, a court should "take into account [a range of policy 
considerations] at least as broad as the range of those a legis-
lature would consider with respect to an express statutory 
authorization of a traditional remedy." Bivens, supra, at 
407. The Court does not explain why this discretion shouldl 
be limited in the manner announced today. 
The Court's absolute language is all the more puzzlingf 
because it comes in a case where the implied remedy is plainly 
appropriate under any measure of discretion. The Federal 
Tort Claims Act, on which petitioners rely, simply is not an I 
adequate remedy.1 And there are reasonably clear indications 
1 The Federal Tort Claims Act is not a federal remedial scheme at all, 1 
but a waiver of sovereign immunity that permits an injured claimant to 
recover damages against the United States where a private person "would 
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that Congress did not intend that statute to displace Bivens 
claims. See ante, at 4-5. No substantial contrary policy has 
been identified, and I am aware of none. I therefore agree 
that a private damages remedy properly is inferred from the 
Constitution in this case. But I do not agree that Bivens 
plaintiffs have a "right" to such a remedy whenever the 
defendant fails to show that Congress has "provided an 
[equally effective] alternative remedy which it explicitly 
declared to be a substitute . ... " In my view, tho Court's 
1(._--.,._,SIQg~!e~ITlii'l:!~SS to infer federal causes of action that cannot be 
found in the Constitution or in a statute denigrates the doc-
trine of separation of powers and hardly comports with a 
rational system ~e. -cr. cannon v. Tln"iversity of Chi-
cago, 441 U.S. 677, 730-749 (1979) (PowELL, J., dissenting).2 
II 
In Part III of its opinion, the Court holds that " 'whenever 
the relevant state survival statute would abate a Bivens-type 
action brought against defendants whose conduct results in 
death, the federal common law allows survival of the action.' H 
Ante, at 9, quoting 581 F. 2d 699, 674-675 (CA7 1978). I 
be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where 
the act or omission occurred." 28 U.S. C.§ 1346 (b); see also 28 U.S. C. 
·§ 2674. Here, as in Bivens itself, a plaintiff denied his constitutional 
remedy would be rPmittcd to the vagaries of state law. Sec 403 U. S., at 
394-395. The FTCA gives the plaintiff even less than he would receive 
under state law in many cases, because the statute is hcd~ed with protec-
tions for the United States. As the Court points out, the FTCA allows l 
neither jury trial nor punitive damages. Ante, at 7. And recovery may 
be barred altogether if the claim arises from a "discretionary function" or 
"the execution of a statute or rp~ulat.ion, whether or not such statute or 
regulation is valid." 28 U.S. C.§ 2680 (a). 
2 I do not suggest that courts enjoy the same degree of freedom to infer 
causes of action from statutes as from the Constitution. See Davis v. I 
Passman, 442 U. S. 228, 241-242 (1979). I do believe, however, that the 
Court today has overstepped the bounds of rational judicial decision-
making in both contexts. 
78-1261-CONCUR 
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agree that the relevant policies require the application of 
federal common law to allow survival in this case. 
It is not "obvious" to me, however, that "the liability of 
federal officials for violations of citizens' constitutional rights 
should be governed by uniform rules" in every case. Ante, at 
8; see id., at 9. On the contrary, federal courts routinely 
refer to state law to fill the procedural gaps in national reme-
dial schemes. The policy against invoking the federal com-
mon law except where necessary to the vitality of a federal 
claim is codified in 42 U. S. C. § 1988, which directs that state 
law ordinarily will govern those aspects of § 1983 actions not 
covered by the "laws of the United States." 
The Court's opinion in this case does stop short of mandat-
ing uniform rules to govern all aspects of Bivens actions. 
Ante, at 9-10, n. 10. But the Court also says that the prefer-
ence for state law embodied in § 1988 is irrelevant to the 
selection of rule·s that will govern actions against federal offi-
cers under Bivens. Ibid. I · ~.- n Butz v. 
Economou, 438 U. S. 478, 498-504, and n. 25 (1978), the 
Court thought it unseemly that different rules should govern 
the liability of federal a.nd sta,te officers for similar constitu-
tionall-la :ms. I would not disturb that understanding today. 
-
~ - 2;3o73 
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Mn. JusTICE PowELL, concurring in the judgment. 
Although I join the judgment, I do not agree with much 
of the language in the Court's opinion. The Court states the 
principles governing Bivens actions as follows: 
"Bivens established that the victims of a constitutional 
violation ... have a right to recover damages. . . . Such 
a cause of action may be defeated ... in two situations. 
The first is when defendants demonstrate 'special factors 
counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action 
by Congress.' . . . The second is when defendants 
show that Congress has provided an alternative remedy 
which it explicitly declared to be a substitute for recovery 
directly under the Constitution and viewed as equally 
effective .... " Ante, at 3-4 (emphasis in original). 
The foregoing statement contains dicta that go well beyond 
the prior holdings of this Court. 
I 
We are concerned here with inferring a right~; ~::~r -:D"uis ~. Pa>SIW!M.> 
nages directly from the Constitution. In the l.jy').. U ~ 2.Z.8 
urt "* said that persons who have "no [other] effective ' · f)> 
ans of redress" "must be able to invoke the existing juris- ?-t.f ;z_ ( 19 ?'i :; 
... . 
.l ~ mvi~ 
v. ~SSMCU\~ 
5u.pnt, ~~ 1-
(JS .> oJ:- :2~2 . 
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diction of the courts for the protection of their justiciable 
constitutional rights." f:Je/I:Jis v. Pe.tBS7nttn, 442 U. 8. 228, 242 (t"" 
(1Q7Q7-:r' The Davis rule now sets the boundaries of the "prin-
cipled discretion" that must be brought to bear when a court 
is asked to infer a private cause of action not specified by 
authority. ld., at 252 (PowELL, J., dissenting). But the 
Court's opinion, read literally, would restrict that discretion 
dramatically. Today we are told that a court must entertain a 
Bivens suit unless the action is "defeated" in one of two 
specified ways. _ . {~ 
As bhc Oom ~ liT£"ognize~+-. Biven~ tl"-i JJP~ £(; implied 
remedies may be siwi~ when Co~res?\las supplied{fv-t...e..u..5SJ..f'j 
"equally effectiveplten1itlve remedies~ !d., at a4~; 1099 y 
Bivens v. Six Unl.:nown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388, 
97 (197lJJ The Court now volunteers the view that a de-
fendant 'Cannot defeat a Bivens action simply by showing that 
there are adequate alternative avenues of relief. The de-
fendant also must show that Congress "explicitly declared 
[its remedy] to be a substitute for recovery directly under the 
Constitution and viewed [it] as equally effective." Ante, at 
4 (emphasis in original). These arc unnecessarily rigid con-
ditions. ·The Court cites no authority and advances no ol~ -+fA ·.s 
reason-indeed no reason at all-for imposing ..td:teir threshold \..: 1 
burden upon the defendant in an implied remedy case. 
The Court does implicitly acknowledge that Congress 
possesses the power to enact adequate alternative remedies 
that would be exclusive. Yet, today's opinion apparently will 
permit Bivens plaintiffs to ignore entirely adequate remedies 
if Congress has not clothed them in the prescribed linguistic 
garb. No purpo<>e is Pcrvrcl by affording plaintiffs a choice of (L . \ 
5 remedies in thci:ie circumstances. Nor do our prior cases ~ \, f\0 ~MSZ. 1.)(2,. 
---re-quire federal courts to stess f8eit' eyes~to congressional ...(: .u _ . .u. 1- 1. . .. 1 
intent t.h.at HJ:ay not~ expressed in t*e languag~we prescribe. La\-W..r 1~· ' 1110.'\ \UY..I(..)Jo.. 
A defendant l!iili5il alSO\ defeat the Bivens remedy under {~ U.L • {-a:\-1 ')') 
today's decision if "speci~ fa:ctors" counsel~te in il!e "'es1 1 Dv\ • 
ahsenCQ of afijrm~~iu8 QQti8ft b3' Cppg!t~!§>. But the Court 
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S:P}?pli8B \no further guidance on this point. The ~nion ~ ~ 
states simply that no such factors are present in this cas~~\J~Cou..r\-4s 
that petitioners enjoy no "independent status in our consti-
tutional scheme" that would make judicially created remedies ('Bit 
inappropriate. Ante, at 4. J ;the implication that official L 
status may be a "special factor" is withdrawn in the sentence 
that follows, which concludes that qualified immunity affords 
all the protection necessary to ensure the effective perform-
ance of official duties. No other factors relevant to the 
purported exception are mentioned. _ _..._ 
One is left to wonder whether judicial discretion in this area 
will hereafter be confined to the single determination that >8? 
legislliltiv~ :r:9~e8y does or does 1 ot comport with the specifi-
ca wns prescribe by this Court. Such a drastic curtailment 
of discretion would be inconsistent with the Court's long-
standing recognition that Congress is ultimately the appro-
priate body to create federal remedies. See ante, at 4-5; 
Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, supra, 403 
U. S., at 397. A plaintiff who seeks his remedy directly under 
the Constitution asks the federal courts to perform an essen-
tially legislative task. In this situation, as Mr. Justice Harlan 
once said, a court should "take into account [a range of policy 
considerations] at least as broad as the range of those a legis-
lature would consider with respect to an express statutor4S 
authoriza.tion of a traditional remedy." Bivens, supr!!:.z._3t ~~{- c}..~ 
407. I do Mt nnder:stanc!Awhy this diScretiOn 'Should be L ~\ • (\ 
1. . d . h d d (\OT OJ. 1m1te m t e manner announce to ay. _ 
Y9t ~ePe J'HiYJf!ling') the Court's absolute language comes in~~ o..\1 ~ MOrL... , L 
a case where the impl~d remedy is plainly appropr!1te under p z:z.\1'/\q ~~IT 
any measure of discretion. The Federal Tort Claims Act, ....) 
""""''l,_ ....... __. ~ o~ petitioner~ simply is not an adequate remedy.1 
tedv l to \-
t\o..tMS A'-+' 
is not a federal remedial scheme at all, but a waiver of 
sovereign immunity that permits an injured claimant to recover damages 
against the United States where a private pert>on "would (be liable to the 
claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omis-
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And there are reasonably clear indications~at Congress did 
not intend that statute to displace Bivens claims. See ante, 
at 4-5. No substantial contrary policy has been identified, 
and I am aware of none. I therefore agree that a private 
damages remedy properly is inferred from the Constitution 
in this case. ut rdo n t a~ :e-tn:at"Bwens plambffs have 
'ng o t 1is remedy when er the defendant fails to mak 
the showing required toda . In my view, the Court's eager 
ness to infer federal ca s of action that cannot be found in 
II 
In Part III of its opinion, the Court holds that" 'whenever 
the relevant state survival statute would abate a Bivens-type 
action brought against defendants whose conduct results in 
1NS6R--I A 
death, the federal common law allows survival of the action.' V 
Ante, at 9, quoting 581 F. 2d 699, 674-675 (CA7 1978). I 
agree that the relevant policies require the application o 
federal ,common law to allow survival in this case. 
sian occurred." 28 U.S. C.§ 1346 (b); see also 28 U.S. C.§ 2674. Here, 
as in Bivens itself, a plaintiff~ denied his constitutional remedy would Y 
be remitted to tho vagaries of state law. See 403 U. S., at 394-395. The 
FTCA gives the plaintiff even less than he would receive under state 
law in many cases, because the sta,tute is Fg_ed with vrotections for the ~ f"TGA o.J...1ow ~ 
United ~ta.tes. As the Court points out, neither jury trial nor punitive L 
damages~I!II auajlghle under t],i FTQ.A.: Ante at 7. And recovery may __{', . ~ 1\1\ 
__ b_e_barre~ altogether if the claim i~ls'C'refionary function" or l ~~~ 1 
"tlie execution of a statute or reguJat,ion, whether or not such statute or 
regulation is valid." 28 U. S.C. § 2680 (a). 
2 I do not suggest that courts enjoy the same degree of freedom to infer 
causes of action from statutes as ~ from the Com;titution. See "?{' 
Davis v. Passman, 442 U. S. 228, 241-242 (1979). I do believe, however, 
that the Court today has overstepped the bounds of rational judicial 
dccisionmaking in both contexts. 
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It is not "obvious" to me, however, that "the liability of 
federal officials for violations of citizens' constitutional rights 
should be governed by uniform rules" in every case. Ante, at 
8; see id., at 9. On the contrary, federal courts routinely 
refer to state law to fill the procedural gaps in national reme-
dial schemes. The policy against invoking the federal com-
mon law except where necessary to the vitality of a federal 
claim is codified in 42 U. S. C. § 1988, which directs that state 
law ordinarily will govern those aspects of § 1983 actions not' 
,_ __ ..;c~o...:..v..:::ered by the "laws of the United States." -~---.~ 
T e Court's opinion in this case(~topf short of mandating l ~ 
uniform rules to govern all aspects of Bivens actions. Ante -(IN SerRi a 
at 9-10, n. 10. ' -~~uia; d t.bc lgast io 
Cieate 8i :rnesamptmn :ffl favor nf federal .commJ.a.w;.. .NG-
sHeh ptesampbion-i~ neee~M' -t~sie.R: Q£ this~ 
M9oFe6\"er, hl-te Oottrt!&ca.ppa.reu,t)~ would re-rerse, in Bi~e1e3 &@oe 
tions against fe eral officers, the presumption fav~.s±.ate .• 
law in § 1983-..l&wsuits ttg~t state .():ffioors. In Butz v. 
-tf.A ~.r \ Economou, 438 U. S. 478, 498-504, and n. 25 (1978), the 
0'j rco~~il!!l:teei thl!f; it W8HlaJ3e UnSeemly -*'.(different ruJes 
Sk.o~ govern the liability of federal and state officers for similar 
J coi1stitutional harms. I would not disturb that understanding 
today. 
.J., 
INSERT A, on p. 4: 
But I do not agree that Bivens plaintiffs have a 
"right" to such a remedy whenever the defendant 
fails to show that Congress has "provided an 
[equally effective] alternative remedy which it 
explicitly declared to be a substitute ..• " In 
my view, the Court's eagerness to infer federal 
causes of action that cannot be found in the 
Constitution or in a statute denigrat~ard~eo~poris 
doctrine of separation of powers and~~· l.,.. ~ 
d4s~ee to a rational system of justice. 
INSERT B, on p. 5 
But the Court also says that the preference for 
state law embodied in ~ 1988 is irrelevant to the 
selection of rules that will govern actions against 
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MR. JusTICE PowELL, concurring in the judgment. 
Although I join the judgment, I do not agree with much 
of the language in the Court's opinion. The Court states the 
principles governing Bivens actions as follow~: 
"Bivens established that the victims of a constitutional 
violation ... have a right to recover damages. . . . Such 
a cause of action may be defeated ... in two situations. 
·.The first is when defendants demonstrate 'special factors 
counst:Jtling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action 
· by Congress.' . . . The second is when defendants 
show that Congress has provided an alternative remedy 
which it explicitly declared to be a substitute for recovery 
directly under the Constitution and viewed as equally 
effective .... " Ante, at 3-4 (emphasis in original). 
The foregoing statement contains dicta that go well beyond 
the prior holdings of this Court. 
I 
We are concerned here with inferring a right of action for 
damages directly from the Constitution. In Davis v. Pass-
man, 442 U. S. 228, 242 (1979), the Court said that persons 
who have "no [other] effective means of redress" "must be 
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able to invoke the existing jurisdiction of the courts for the 
protection of their justiciable constitutional rights." The 
Davis rule now sets the boundaries of the "principled discre-
tion" that must be brought to bear when a court is asked to 
infer a private cause of action not specified by I authority. 
!d., at 252 (PowELL, J., dissenting). But the Court's opinion, 
read literally, would restrict that discretion dramatically. 
Today we are told that a court must entertain a Bivens suit 
unless the action is "defeated" in one of two specified ways. , t 
Bivens recognized that implied remedies may be unnec_e_s- --{-. ~rov1·cJ..J..a 
sary when Congress hasJSWfltJii'~qj:.'.,..equally effective" alterna-
tive remedies. Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 
403 U. S. 388, 397 (1971); see Davis v. Passman, supra, 442 
U. S. , at 248. The Court now volunteers the view that a de-
fendant cannot defeat a Bivens action simply by showing that 
there are adequate alternative avenues of relief. The de-
fendant also must show that Congress "explicitly declared 
[its remedy] to be a substitute for recovery directly under the 
Constitution and viewed [it] as equally effective." Ante, at 
4 (emphasis in original). These are unnecessarily rigid con-
ditions. The Court cites no authority and advances no policy 
reason-indeed no reason at all-for imposing this threshold 
burden upon the defendant in an implied remedy case. 
The Court does implicitly acknowledge that Congress 
possesses the power to enact adequate alternative remedies 
that would be exclusive. Yet, today's opinion apparently will 
permit Bivens plaintiffs to ignore entirely adequate remedies 
if Congress has not clothed them in the prescribed linguistic ( 
garb. No purpose is served by affording plaintiffs a choice of_. 1s 1tu.~ ()..t-- '1 
remedies in these circumstances. No!fiQ QWP p1ior ca:~CI! ft. (.,Lc;(~.:r 
Feqnin~- federal courts to blind themselves to congressional ~ (1 _ _ . • 
intent. expressed in language other than that which we -rov 1'€..,~ tAj 
prescnbe. 
A defendant also may defeat the Bivens remedy under 
today's decision if "special factors" counsel "hesitation." But 
the Court provides no further guidance on this point. The 
78-1261-CONCUR 
CARLSON v. GREEN 3 
opmwn states simply that no such factors are present in this 
case. The Court sa.ys that petitioners enjoy no "independent 
status in our constitutional scheme" that would make judi-
r cially ereated remedies inappropriate. Ante, at 4. Bu~unph­
cation that official status may be a "special factor" is with-
dra.wn in the sentence that follows, which concludes that 
qualified immunity affords all the protection necessary to 
ensure the effective performance of official duties. No other 
factors relevant to the purported exception are mentioned. 
One is left to wonder whether judicial discretion in this area 
will hereafter be confined to the question of alternative reme-
dies, which is in turn reduced to the single determination that 
congressional action does or does not comport with the specifi-
cations prescribed by this Court. Such a drastic curtailment 
of discretion would be inconsistent with the Court's long-
standing recognition that Congress is ultimately the appro-
priate body to create federal remedies. See ante, at 4-5; 
Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, supra, 403 
U. S., at 397. A plaintiff who seeks his remedy directly under 
the Constitution asks the federal courts to perform an essen-
tially legislative task. In this situation, as Mr. Justice Harlan 
once said, a court should "take into account [a range of policy 
considerations] at least as broad as the range of those a legis-
lature would consider with respect to an express statutory 
authorization of a traditional remedy." Bivens, supra, at 
407. The Court does not explain why this discretion should 
be limited in the manner announced today. 
The Court's absolute language is all the more puzzling 
because it comes in a case where the implied remedy is plainly 
appropriate under any measure of discretion. The Federal 
Tort Claims Act, on which petitioners rely, simply is not an 
adequate remedy.1 And there are reasonably clear indications 
1 The Federal Tort Claims Act is not a federal remedial scheme at all, 
but a waiver of sovereign immunity that permits an injured claimant to 
recover damages against the United States where a private person "would 
78-1261-CONCUR 
4 CARLSON v. GREEN 
that Congress did not intend that statute to displace Bivens 
claims. See ante, at 4-5. No substantial contrary policy has 
been identified, and I am aware of none. I therefore agree 
that a private damages remedy properly is inferred from the 
Constitution in this case. But I do not agree that Bivens 
plaintiffs have a "right" to such a remedy whenever the 
defendant fails to show that Congress has "provided an 
[equally effective] alternative remedy which it explicitly 
IN ·1 \\ 1·1'4 t'Q_$& declared to be a substitute. . . ." In my view, the Court's 
U eageFJ;J,iil~ to infer federal causes of action that cannot be 
found in t e Constitution or in a statute denigrates the doc-
trine of separation of powers and hardly comports with a rk ]~justice. Cf. Cannon v. University of Chi-
cago, 441 U.S. 677, 730-749 (1979) (PowELL, J., dissenting).2 
II 
In Part III of its opinion, the Court holds that " 'whenever 
the relevant state survival statute would abate a Bivens-type 
action brought against defendants whose conduct results in 
death, the federal common law allows survival of the action.' " 
Ante, at 9, quoting 581 F. 2d 699, 674-675 (CA7 1978). I 
be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where 
the act or omission occurred." 28 U.S. C.§ 1346 (b) ; sec also 28 U.S. C. 
§ 2674. Here, as in Bivens itself, a plaintiff denied his constitutional 
remedy would be remitted to the vagaries of slate law. See 403 U. S., at 
394-395. The FTCA gives the plaintiff even less than be would receive 
under state Jaw in many cases, because the statute is hedged with protec-
tions for the United States. As the Court points out, the FTCA allows 
neither jury trial nor punitive damages. Ante, at 7. And recovery may 
be barred altogether if the claim arises from a "discretionary function" or 
"the execution of a statute or regulation, whether or not such statute or 
regulation is valid." 28 U. S. C. § 2680 (a). 
2 I do not suggest that courts enjoy the same degree of freedom to infer 
causes of act.ion from statutes as from the Constitution. See Davis v. 
Passman, 442 U. S. 228, 241-242 (1979). I do believe, however, tha.t the 
Court today has overstepped the bounds of rational judicial decision-
making in both contexts. 
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agree that the relevant policies require the application of 
federal common law to allow survival in this case. 
It is not "obvious" to me, however, that "the liability of 
federal officials for violations of citizens' constitutional rights 
should be governed by uniform rules" in every case. Ante, at 
8; see id., at 9. On the contrary, federal courts routinely 
refer to state law to fill the procedural gaps in national reme-
dial schemes. The policy against invoking the federal com-
mon law except where necessary to the vitality of a federal 
claim is codified in 42 U. S. C. § 1988, which directs that state 
law ordinarily will govern those aspects of § 1983 actions not 
covered by the "laws of the United States." 
The Court's opinion in this case does stop short of mandat-
ing uniform rules to govern aJI aspects of Bivens actions. 
Ante, at 9-10, n. 10. But the Court also says that the prefer-
ence for state law embodied in § 1988 is irrelevant to the 
selection of rules that will govern actions against federal offi-
cers under Bivens. Ibid. I ,\~ R6b agree.. In Butz v. 
Economou, 438 U. S. 478, 498-504, and n. 25 (1978), the 
Court thought it unseemly that different rules should govern 
,__ _ _.._:t~h:..:::e~l~iability of federal and state officers for similar constitu-
tional~. I would not disturb that understanding today. 
To : The Chief Justice 
)£T . Justice Brennan 
llr. Justice Stewart 
Mr . Justice W:bJ.te 
Ur. Justice MI'Shllll 
Wr . Justioe Blaob:mn 
){r Justice R•.'>hr.·q u 1st 
llr . Justice Stevens 
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MR. JusTICJ<J PowELL, concurring in the judgment. 
Although I join the judgment, I do not agree with much 
of the language in the Court's opinion. The Court states the 
principles governing Bivens actions as follows : 
"Bivens established that the victims of a constitutional 
violation ... have a right to recover damages. . . . Such 
a cause of action may be defeated ... in two situations. 
The first is when defendants demonstrate 'special factors 
counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action 
by Congress.' . . . The second is when defendants 
show that Congress has provided an alternative remedy 
which it explicitly declared to be a substitute for recovery 
directly under the Constitution and viewed as equally 
effective ...• " Ante, at 3-4 (emphasis in original) . 
The foregoing statement contains dicta that go well beyond 
the prior holdings of this Court. 
We are concerned here with inferring a right of action for 
damages directly from the Constitution. In Davis v. Pass-
man, 442 U. S. 228, 242 (1979), the Court said that persons 
who have "no [other] effective means of redress" "must be 
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able to invoke the existing jurisdiction of the courts for the 
protection of their justiciable constitutional rights." The 
Davis rule now sets the boundaries of the "principled discre-
tion' ' that must be brought to bear when a court is asked to 
infer a private cause of action not specified by the enacting 
authority. !d., at 252 (POW.bJLL, J .. dissenting). But the 
Court's opinion. read literally. would restrict that discretion 
dramatically. Today we are told that a court must entertain 
a Bivens suit uuless the action is "defeated' ' in one of two 
specified ways. 
Bivens recognized that implied remedies may be unneces-
sary when Congress has provided "equally cffecti VC' ., alterna-
tive remedies. Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 
403 U. S. 388, 397 (1971); see Davis v. Passman, s·upra, 442 
U. S. , at 248. The Court uow volunteers the view that a de-
fendant cannot defeat a Bivens action simply by showing that 
there are adequate alternative avenues of relief. The de-
feudant also must show that Congress "explicitly declared 
[its remedy] to be a substitute for recovery directly under the 
Constitution and viewed [it] as equally effective." Ante, at 
4 (emphasis in original). These are unnecessarily rigid con-
ditions. The Court cites no authority and advances no policy 
reason- indeed no reason at all-for imposing this threshold 
burden upon the defendant in an implied remedy case. 
The Court does implicitly acknowledge that Congress 
possesses the power to enact adequate alternative remedies 
that would be exclusive. Yet, toclay's opinion apparently will 
permit Bivens plaintiffs to ignore entirely adequate remedies 
if Congress has not clothed them in the prescribed linguistic 
garb. No purpose is served by affording plaintiffs a choice of 
remedies in these circumstances. Nor is there any precedent 
for requiring federal courts to blind themselves to congres-
sional intent expressed in language other than that which we 
prescribe. 
A defendant also may defeat the Bivens remedy under 
loclay's decision if "special factors" counsel "hesitation." But. 
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the Court provides no further guidance on this point. The 
opinion states simply that no such factors are present in this 
case. The Court says that petitioners enjoy no "independent 
status in our constitutional scheme" that would make judi-
cially created remedies inappropriate. Ante, at 4. But the 
implication that official status may be a "special factor" is with-
drawn in the sentence that follows, which concludes that 
qualified ir~1munity affords all the protection necessary to 
ensure the effective performance of official duties. No other 
factors relevant to the purported exception are mentioned. 
One is left to wonder whether judicial discretion in this area 
will hereafter be confined to the question of alternative reme-
dies, which is in turn reduced to the single determination that 
congressional action does or does not comport with the specifi-
cations prescribed by this Court. Such a drastic curtailment 
of discretion would be inconsistent with the Court's long-
stauding recognition that Congress is ultimately the appro-
priate body to create federal remedies. See ante, at 4-5; 
Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, supra, 403 
U. S., at 397. A plaintiff who seeks his remedy directly under 
the Constitution asks the federal courts to perform an essen-
tially legislative task. In this situation, as Mr. Justice Harlan 
once said, a court should "take into account la range of policy 
considerations] at least as broad as the range of those a legis-
lature would consider with respect to an express statutory 
authorization of a traditional remedy." Bivens, supra, at 
407. The Court does not explain why this discretion should 
be limited in the manner announced today. 
The Court's absolute language is all the more puzzling 
because it comes in a case where the implied remedy is plainly 
appropriate under any measure of discretion. The Federal 
Tort Claims Act, on which petitioners rely, simply is not an 
adequate remedy.1 And there are reasonably clear indications 
1 The Federal Tort Claim~ Ac1 is not a frdcral remedial scheme at all, 
Lqt a wajver of sovereign immunity that prrmits an injurrd claimant to 
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that Congress did not intend that statute to displace Bivens 
claims. See ante, at 4-5. No substantial contrary policy has 
been identified, and I am aware of none. I therefore agree 
that a private damages remedy properly is inferred from the 
Constitution in this case. But I do not agree that Bivens 
plaintiffs have a "right" to such a remedy whenever the 
defendant fails to show that Congress has "provided an 
[equally effective] alternative remedy which it explicitly 
declared to be a substitute . ... " In my view, the Court's 
willingness to infer federal causes of actiou that cannot be 
found in the Constitution or in a statute denigrates the doc-
trine of separation of powers and hardly comports with a 
rational system of justice. Cf. Cannon Y. University of Chi-
eago, 441 U.S. 677, 730-749 (1979) (Pow.J<.:LL, J., dissenting).2 
II 
In Part III of its opinion, the Court holds that '' 'whenever 
the relevant state survival statute would abate a Bivens-type 
action brought against defendants whose conduct results in 
death, the federal common law allows survival of the action.' " 
Ante, at 9, quoting 581 F. 2d 699, 674-675 (CA7 1978). I 
recover damages against the United States where a private per~on "would 
be liabiP to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where 
the act or omi::;sion occurred." 28 U.S. C.§ 1346 (b); sre abo 28 U.S. C. 
§ 2674. Here, ns in Bivens itself, a plaintiff denied his eonl'titutional 
remedy would be rPmitted to the vagaries of ~tate law. See 403 U. S., Ht 
394-395. The FTCA givrs the plaiutiff evt•n le:s~ than he would receive 
tmdrr stall' law in many ca~~,.,, becau~e thP ,.;tntutc is hedged with proLec-
tiom for the United Statrs. A~ the Court points out, the FTCA allows 
nrither jury trial nor punitive damage::;. Ante, at 7. And l'l'covery may 
UP barred altogether if the claim arises from a "discretionary function" or 
"tlw execution of a statute or regulat.ion, whether or not such stt~tutc or 
regulation is valid." 28 U.S. C.§ 2680 (a). 
~I do not suggest that courts enjoy the same degree of freedom to infer 
can:-;c::; of act.ion from stMutes as from t.he Constitution. Sec Davis v. 
PaBi:irnan, 442 U.S. 228, 241-242 (19i9) . I do believe, however, that. Lhe 
Court today ha:; over"1:cpped the bounds of ra tiona! judicial deeision-
making in both context.s. 
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agree that the relevant policies require the application of 
federal common law to allow survival in this case. 
It is not "obvious" to me, however, that "the liability of 
federal officials for violations of citizens' constitutional rights 
should be governed by uniform rules" in every case. Ante, at 
8; see id., at 9. On the contrary, federal courts routinely 
refer to state law to fill the procedural gaps in national reme-
dial schemes. The policy against invoking the federal com-
mon law except where necessary to the vitality of a federal 
claim is codified in 42 U. S. C. § 1988, which directs that state 
law ordinarily will govern those aspects of § 1983 actions not 
covered by the "laws of the United States." 
The Court's opinion in this case does stop short of mandat-
ing uniform rules to govern all aspects of Bivens actions. 
Ante, at 9-10, n. 10. But the Court also says that the prefer-
ence for state law embodied in § 1988 is irrelevant to the 
selection of rules that will govern actions against federal offi-
eers under Bivens. Ibid. I see no basis for this view. In 
Butz v. Economou, 438 U. S. 478. 498-504. and n. 25 (1978), 
the Court thought it. unseemly that different rules should 
govern the liability of federal and state officers for similar 
constitutional wrongs. I would not disturb that under·-
standing today, 
